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PREFACE 
In 1989, the Council for Social and Economic Studies published 
The Tragedy of Tibet by Eva M. Neterowicz. This excellent account 
of China's efforts to occupy and assimilate the Tibetan people was a 
moving, well-documented, and exceptionally useful tool for studying 
international relations. In 1993, Dr. Roger Pearson of the Council 
for Social and Economic Studies and I discussed the book, which was 
at the time out of print, and agreed that I would update the original 
study and add additional chapters in an effort to highlight the work's 
relevance for the study of world politics. Dr. Neterowicz kindly 
agreed to this project and allowed me to make the necessary 
modifications. Tibet: Endurance of the National Idea is the result of 
efforts to accomplish those objectives. I revised Dr. Neterowicz's 
chapters in an effort to take make more explicit points relevant to the 
study of international relations and added the Introduction, Chapter 
6, and Chapter 7. I hope that the resultant work has preserved the 
quality of Dr. Neterowicz's research while also incorporating my own. 
Since my hand was the last one to touch the manuscript, I accept 
responsibility for any oversights or shortcomings that the reader may 
find. 
I would like to thank Ann M. Ingram for her valuable editorial 
assistance on the final draft of the manuscript. In addition, I want to 
express my appreciation to Sandra Fowler, Krista Williams, Melanie 
Eichelbaum, Chad Triolet, and John Frazer, the student assistants in 
the Department of Political Science who provided their patient 
assistance in the preparation of this study. 
Stephen R. Bowers 
James Madison University 
October 27, 1994 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the collapse of Communism, first in Eastern Europe and then 
in the Soviet Union itself, the post-World War Two territorial status 
quo, long accepted as the permanent order, was called into question. 
This event had implications not only for the nations of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also for other Communist 
Party states. The most powerful of the remaining Communist 
regimes has been dramatically affected by the fall of what was once 
a powerful global ideology. With the breakup of the Soviet empire, 
many of China's national minorities have intensified the reassertion 
of their traditional identities. 
While there are important differences between the demographic 
situations of the Soviet Union and China, the similarities between the 
two are striking. TheY_.9:re alike in that the ruling groups in each of 
the~mpires, upon coming to power, faced the bitter enmity of most 
of the minorities within its territory. The "Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) brought most of the Chinese minorities under its control by 
either force of arms or the threat of military action against people 
who knew that resistance to the Han Chinese was futile. In a similar 
fashion, the Sovi~~ an institution that was widely 
viewed as little more than an extension of Russian power, held sway 
over the USSR by usin~ brutal, repressive tactics against mirrnfifies 
generally unwilling toaccept continued Russian domination after the 
fall of the Czarist regime. The Chinese, like the Russians, found 
themselves in control of an empire of which they did not have 
complete understanding. Upon assuming control, the CCP could call 
upon the services of only a small group of minorities specialists within 
the party. As a result, ignorance of minority customs and traditions 
was widespread and the danger of inad~fending people was 
always present. In apparent desperation, the Chinese utilized the 
services of Soviet specialists on minorities problems. Considering the 
terrible shortcomings of Soviet nationalities policies that were 
developed from the earliest Soviet days by Joseph Stalin, it is not 
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surprising that the Chinese also encountered significant problems in 
dealing with the non-Han population. Each nation also followed the 
practice of giving minorities autonomous regions in which they might 
enjoy at least some privileges in the pursuit of cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness. In each state there was, in effect, a 'social contract' 
whereby the minorities were to pledge allegiance to central powers in 
return for certain economic and political benefits. Finally, the Soviet 
and Chinese situations are alike in that, for both empires, the 
minorities regions were extremely important by virtue of their 
holdings of natural resources. Neither nation could afford the loss of 
territories which were central to their economic programs and vital 
to the welfare of their dominant ethnic groups. 1 
In spite of these and other important similarities, there are 
significant differences in how each nation has dealt with its minority 
population. The Soyi.e.t leadership was forced to deal with an 
overwhelming minority population, almost 50% of its national 
population . China's non-Han po ulaf has never exceec1ed 
8%. As a result of this demographic situation, the nationalities 
problem became the central challenge to the existence of the Soviet 
sta..tF,While in China it never assumed such a significant and threaten-
ing status. It is this demographic dispad!Y that produced the greatest 
differ~ behveen Chinese and SO"'yiet nationalities policy. Severely 
challenged by the existence of non-Russian groups, the Soviet 
Commu~arty was milch more consistent in pursuing a hanlline 
pol!9:. that made only relatively minor concessions to the nation's 
minorities. As late as 1221, Gorbachev's opponents were mobilized 
in the face of what they saw as the erosion of the 'social contract' 
which -nad for $ars kept non-Russians in a sub_ordinate Q"osition. 
Many Soviet specialists suggested that the timing of the 1991 coup n oj 
was motivated by the impending conclusion of a new state treaty ~  
which would have given much broader freedoms to the USSR's ethnic 
minorities. 
In contrast with Soviet policy, the Chinese method of dealing with 
ethnic minorities was somewhat more flexible. While it went through 
phases of severe repression, it also exhibited periods of relative 
toleration of minority cultures and traditions. During the more 
repressive periods, the study of local languages was discouraged and, 
in many cases, made criminal. Often, as during the Great Leap 
Forward in the 1950s, distinctive styles of dress and other cultural 
manifestations were prohibited in an effort to encourage national 
unit¥- In 1975, Chinese authorities required people to begin working 
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on Fridays, an especially significant action in Muslim areas in which 
FridaY-was the recognized holyCfay. In the Muslim communit~s of 
Xil!iiang pwvmce, flOtS followed the issuance of this OLder. The 
establishment ofcomniunes, an event which took lace in the Tibetan 
Autono ous egion in the 1960l;;, '.val;; another element of official 
repression of the lifestyles of the non-Han ~n. 
The most significant turning point in Chinese natlonalities policy 
came in 1971 with the fall of Lin Biao, the hardliner who had long 
been regarded as Mao's heir apparent. Following his death and the 
removal from power of key commanders of his military unit, the 
Chinese Fourth Field Army, language policy became more relaxed 
and, once again, people were allowed to study different languages. 
Non-~guage newspapers and radio stations rea~d and 
individuals who had been denounced for their interest mother 
lan~hahilitated. 
With Deng Xiaoping's political return in 1978, minorities policies 
became even more tolerant. The motivations for this increased 
tolerance were, according to June Teufel Dreyer, both economic and 
political. Certai it was an objective of Deng's policy that all 
minorif e encoura ed to support hIS our rmza Ions 
pro~ and mak0heir contributions to mcreasmg pro uCtlvlty and 
therebx improving Chinese living standards. The political motiva-
tions, however, were more extensive and lncluded objectives in both 
foreign and domestic policies. An important foreign policy goal was 
to hm2IQve Chinese relations with the Islamic states, nations wh2,.Se 
suppoJ:!. could greatly enhance prospects for modernizing the ChinC?se 
eCgnQmy. Improvements in the lot of China's Muslim community 
would, authoritie.s..lm.p..ed, significantly improve Beijing's relations with 
the Islamic states. Another crucial political goal was to minimize 
TaiWcU;'s fears about eventual unjfication with the mainland -by 
demons.trating that minorities in the PRC could thrive and enjoy the 
autonomy that would allow them to preserve many of their distinctive 
tradid;;iis. It was also important, for propaganda purposes, to be able 
to portray Mao's philosophy as one which was relevant for both 
Chin.§se and non-Chinese people. This theme was a major part of 
Beijing's appeartcr-lhe nati6i1s of the developing world.2 
Tolerance toward China's ethnic minorities had several important 
co,ns.e.quences. First, Mao's dismissal of the end~onal 
identities as simply ano ler class issue was repudiated. Second, the 
part~ned that problems in minority areas cOUld be elli1iliiated 
by ending the backwardness associated with those regions. As a 
--- -
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result, economic development was stressed and officials promoted the 
creation of a market system. Third, mino!!!y areas were encouraged 
to develop commercial ties with those nations which had an interest 
in their ~Cfore;rnmple, developed economic ties with 
Nepal aswell as with prosperous overseas ethnic TIbetans. The goal 
was to encourage individuals who wished to establish economic 
operations in minority areas, operations which would enhance local 
economies and relieve Beijing of some of the financial burden of 
supporting these regions? 
In spite of these innovations, little was accomplished in meeting 
Beijing's goals for minorities. Authorities claimed that their policy 
aimed at increasing the numbers of minority peoples, but, in fact, 
during the eight years for which statistics are available, there was only 
a small increase in their actual numbers. As a result of tax benefits 
for ethnic minorities, many people chose to claim minority status for 
economic reasons. Over half of the increase in minority populations 
comes from those seeking economic advantage. Nor were the 
economic improvements that were intended for ethnic minorities 
realized. During the 1980s, the economic gap between these regions 
and the Han areas became even greater and many minorities became 
convinced that they were victims of Han exploitation because they 
were providing raw materials while the Han were creating the more 
expensive finished products. Even efforts to encourage foreign 
contacts failed to bring the desired benefits. I Tourists coming to 
minority areas were, with alarming frequency, shocked by the obvious 
mistreatment of minorities, while many economic openings, such as 
those with the so-called Golden Triangle of Burma, Thailand, and 
Laos, simply opened parts of China up to a renewal of the o]2ium 
tr~e. The use of unsterilized needles by drug addicts led t£ the 
appearance of an .61DS pr~in China.4 
It is not surprising that China's mmority population reacted 
negatively to Beijing's policies in their regions. Uigurs, Kazakhs, and 
others engaged in public and often violent protests against central 
authorities. Of the Chinese minority nations, none has demonstrated 
its resilience and determination more than Tibet. It is significant that 
even during the more flexible periods of Chinese policy toward 
minorities, the Tibetans were still subject to many of the more 
repressive aspects of Beijing's policy. In a reaction against China's 
occupation of Tibet, the region has become the site of an increasing 
number of protests in recent years. In 1994, Re Di, the vice-secretary 
of the Tibetan Communist Party, complained bitterly about the 
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increasing number of Tibetans embracing the Tibetan national idea 
and rejecting Chinese claims that Tibet was an integral party of 
China.s The history of the Chinese-Tibetan conflict is significant 
because it demonstrates the endurance of this national idea in the 
face of Beijing's overwhelming military and political pressure. It is 
important in that it proves that the utility of military, political, and 
economic force is limited by a variety of circumstances that are 
founded in culture and tradition. 
Notes 
1 Edward Friedman, "China's North-South Split and the Forces of Disintegra-
tion", Current History, September, 1993, pp. 269-274. 
2 June Teufel Dreyer, China's Political System: Modemization and Tradition, 
New York: Paragon House, 1993, pp. 375-378. 
3 Ibid., pp. 377-382. 
4 Ibid., pp. 381-386. 
5 Foreign Broadcast Information Sen'ice - China Daily Reports, 3 June 1994, p. 
80. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Tibetan Society and Culture 
As the Chinese Communists massed their population to celebrate 
the thirty-eighth anniversary of the victory of Mao Zedong and the 
founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1988, 
almost two thousand miles from Beijing a determined group of 
Tibetan monks and lay people staged a protest against Chinese 
Communist rule in their homeland. 
Their protest made few demands but had a growing significance. 
While the world has perceived the leadership of Deng Xiaoping as 
more benign than that of the radical Mao Zedong, especially during 
Mao's last years when he launched the destructive Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution, the situation in Tibet demonstrated that there 
have been few significant changes in the treatment of the so-called 
"minority nationalities" by Deng Xiaoping's regime. In fact, the 
elements of continuity of policy are probably more numerous than the 
elements of change. 
While there are differences among scholars over whether Tibet is 
legally an independent nation, it is nevertheless clear that the Chinese 
communists brutally suppressed the freedom of the Tibetan people 
by military invasion in 1950, increased their oppression in 1959, 
forced the spiritual and temporal leader, the Dalai Lama, to flee to 
India, and conducted a systematic persecution of the Tibetan people, 
their culture and religion ever since. 
Tibet's ancient culture and history are very different from those of 
the Han - the Chinese people who first united China thousands of 
years ago. Tibet's language, alphabet, culture, folk tradition, litera-
ture, customs, and art are notably different from those of the 
countries surrounding it. In addition, it has a unique religion, based 
on Buddhism, with its own spiritual and temporal leader, the Dalai 
Lama. The action of the PRC in October of 1987 made clear what 
had been obvious since the army of Mao Zedong invaded and 
subjugated Tibet in 1950 - that a relentless war is being waged to 
suppress the Tibetan culture and to replace it with PRC-directed 
communism. Seeking to eliminate any nationalist tradition, the PRC 
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has waged war not only against the Tibetan culture, but even against 
the traditional cultures of the Chinese and Mongolian peoples. 
In October, 1988, thousands of Tibetans took to the streets to 
vigorously protest the oppression of Tibet and to demand indepen-
dence. The last days of September had seen the execution of two 
Tibetan nationals and the imprisonment ofriine others. On October 
1, the anniversary of the founding of the PRC, two thousand angry 
Tibetans stoned and torched a police station in the capital city of 
Lhasa. On the last day of a major ten-day Buddhist prayer festival 
in October, thousands of Tibetans gathered to demand independence, 
and PRC Chinese troops fired tear gas and eventually bullets into the 
crowd. At least three people were killed, including a monk, and later 
reports indicated that even more people were killed. The PRC acted 
quickly to remove foreign visitors from Tibet and to seal off the 
Tibetan capital to all foreigners.! On March 5, 1989, the 30th 
anniversary of the Tibetan armed rebellion as well as the first 
anniversary of the 1988 protests, violence returned to Tibet as 
thousands of Tibetans once again expressed their fury at China's 
domination of this province. Approximately a dozen Tibetans died 
and over a hundred people were injured as demonstrators attacked 
the Regional Office for Receiving Returned Tibetans, the office 
building of the Lhasa Construction Bureau, and other buildings 
associated with the process of transforming Tibet into a model of 
China. Numerous party buildings were also targeted by angry 
demonstrators.2 The events of 1988 and 1989 set a pattern which 
was to continue into the next decade as thousands of Tibetans 
resisted the transformation of their nation by the leadership of a 
Chinese Communist Party which was determined to erase a centuries-
old culture and replace it with one widely regarded as foreign. 
To comprehend the significance of the current struggle, it is 
necessary to have a thorough understanding of the unique Tibetan 
society as well as Tibetan efforts to preserve their culture and history. 
Tibet has a civilization and recorded history almost two thousand 
years old. This nation's provides a unique example of a brave and 
determined people who, while willing to change to meet the challeng-
es of the twentieth century, still wish to preserve the achievements of 
their society. Tibet's experiences illustrate that in spite of being 
subjected to both military and political repression, the idea of 
nationhood can endure when a people are determined to preserve 
that concept. 
Tibetan Society and Culture 15 
The Setting for Tibet 
Western studies of international relations always start with an 
examination of the components of national power. The case of Tibet 
is important in that it illustrates the variety of factors that constitute 
power but it also provides an insight into those factors which act as 
constraints on power. It is obvious that Tibet enjoys some of the 
most important attributes of power: impressive natural resources and, 
especially before it was partitioned, an expansive territory that should 
give the nation an important military advantage. However, it is 
apparent that the personal orientations of the Tibetans themselves 
are such that its natural wealth has not been effectively exploited and 
the advantages of its difficult mountainous terrain have not overcome 
the force of invaders equipped with modern instruments of war. 
Historic Tibet is a much larger territory than one sees on current 
maps of the PRe. Over one half of Tibet's original territory was 
added to nearby Chinese provinces. Viewing a contemporary map of 
Tibet, only the area of Central Tibet (called U-Tsang) and sections 
of Eastern Tibet (called Kham) are shown as parts of the PRC-
designated Tibet Autonomous Region. Other Tibetan lands include 
the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, now a part of China's Kansu 
Province; Ngapa and Kanzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures, which 
are incorporated in Szechuan Province; and Dechen Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture, considered part of Yunnan Province. A few 
Tibetans also live in other areas outside of the PRC's control, such 
as India and Nepal, but the PRC statistics on Tibet include only those 
Tibetans living in the "Tibetan Autonomous Region", and therefore 
do not present a full picture of the Tibetan population. 
Nevertheless, one can readily see from a map of the PRC the 
geographic significance of this area. The Tibetan plateau represents 
fully one-fourth of China's entire land mass. A region of high 
elevation, situated on the 'roof of the world,' it possesses a vast 
potential of unexplored and, consequently, unexploited mineral 
wealth. Specialists in geopolitics can readily see that it occupies a 
strategic location on the tense borders of India and the former 
USSR. As will be discussed later, Mao Zedong viewed Tibet as a 
strategic block to both India and Russia and sought to make it a site 
for China's nuclear defenses. 
Tibet is a region in which natural resources represent an important 
potential for national power. Tibet's minerals are an important and 
relatively untapped source of future wealth. They include iron, coal, 
asphalt, oil-shale, tin, copper, jade, and zinc. Tibet is also credited 
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with possessing the world's largest lithium reserves with lithium 
deposits established at half the world's total. There are also deposits 
of uranium and plutonium.3 
Despite this mineral wealth and the potential that it holds, Tibet 
remains an underdeveloped country with a limited economic base. 
Although historically the Tibetans have been self sufficient in food -
a very basic diet of wheat, flour, tea, yak meat, etc. - they have 
suffered in recent years from famine when the Chinese Communists 
made unreasonable and excessive demands on their limited food 
resources. 
Tibetans are found in two major occupations: herders and farmers, 
with some commercial pursuits. The country has a large amount of 
farmland where the major crops are rice, corn, barley, wheat, 
buckwheat, and broad beans. Farming methods followed age-old 
customs, utilizing wooden ploughs and yaks until recently when some 
mechanization has occurred. Forestry is important, with pine, spruce, 
and fir among the chief lumber products.4 
Tibet retains the appearance of a vast pastureland with millions of 
hectares for the grazing of a variety of animals including cows, yaks, 
goats, sheep, donkeys, and mules. On the Tibetan farm, the yak 
traditionally occupied a central role, providing tender, lean meat, 
milk, cheese, and butter. Yak hair and hide is used for boot-making, 
thread, blankets, clothing and even boats and tents. Yak dung is 
dried and used for fuel. s 
Traditional Tibetan society has changed little over the centuries. 
The recorded history of Tibet began about 127 B.c., but the most 
significant events in its history occurred between the seventh and 
tenth centuries A.D., when the country was unified and became a 
major power in Central Asia. The country's borders remained largely 
unchanged from the tenth century until the Chinese Communist 
invasion which then cut off major areas which had long been part of 
Tibet. 
Tibetan culture was influenced by other cultures in the region 
because of its relations with its neighbors including the Chinese, 
Mongols, Manchus, Nepalese, Indians, Russians and even the British. 
While seeking a continued independent status, Tibet fell under the 
control of other powers in the region: the Manchu Emperors, the 
Nepalese Kings, the Mongol Khans, and the British rulers in India. 
Controversy in international law developed when the Manchu Empire 
fell in 1911 and the ruler of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, asserted full 
independence. The succeeding Republic of China never officially 
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recognized Tibet's declaration of independence, but remained too 
weak and preoccupied (Le., unifying China, fighting the Japanese, and 
resisting the Communist threat) to enforce its claims on Tibet. The 
question became moot when the Chinese Communists sent in troops 
in 1950, snuffing out Tibetan freedom and independence. From that 
time onward the Tibetan culture and religion were under siege by the 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoists who ruled from Beijing. 
Tibetan history, culture, and politics can best be understood by 
examining the religious tradition of Tibetan Buddhism which became 
the essential fabric of Tibetan society, carefully weaving every aspect 
of Tibetan life. An examination of this crucial facet of the Tibetan 
population helps explain why these people have, over the years, been 
unable to translate their abundant natural resources into a base for 
national power which would have aided them in resisting the 
pressures of powerful and expansionist neighbors. 
Tibetan Political Development 
During the seventh century, the region we now refer to as Tibet 
was occupied by a group of nomadic tribes. An energetic leader, 
Tsanpo Songtsen Gampo (620-649), became known as the "father of 
Tibet" because of his crucial role in creating a unified entity. He 
subdued the various peoples on the borders of Tibet and arranged 
matrimonial alliances with neighboring powers (Le., a princess from 
Nepal and a princess from China). These two marriages had a great 
influence on Tibet, for these brides were responsible for the introduc-
tion of Buddhism into Tibet. 
Other leaders who influenced Tibet's growth were Emperors 
Trisong Detsen (755-797) and Tritsug Detsen Ralpachen (817-836). 
Emperor Trison Detson extended Tibetan influence across the Pamirs 
as far as the empires of the Arabs and the Turks in the west, to 
Turkestan in the north, and as far south as Nepal. Tibetan armies 
overran the Chinese provinces of Gansu and Szechuan, and the 
ensuing treaty confirmed his conquests on the Chinese border. 
Tibet's Imperial Age lasted about two centuries. It ended with the 
assassination of Tsanpo Ra\pachen in 836. Two accomplishments 
were evident during this time: the creation of a unified Tibetan state 
maintaining regular relations with its neighbors and the formation of 
a distinct Tibetan state with predominant Buddhist features. 
During the middle of the ninth century, the Tibetan ruler Tsanpo 
Langdarma (836-842) met the same fate as Tsanpo Ralpachen. He 
was assassinated in 842 and an 'age of assassinations' began. The 
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ruling dynasty was terminated with this assassination, and the empire 
collapsed. The once unified area fragmented into a number of 
principalities inclined toward war with one another. 
The fortunes of Buddhism varied in this period. The reign of 
Tsanpo Ralpachen witnessed the persecution of Buddhism, but after 
his assassination, Tibet's foreign ties shifted from China to India and 
Nepal. With this shift there came a renewal of Buddhism and many 
prominent Buddhist teachers came to Tibet. 
As a consequence of these developments, the political role of 
Buddhism now advanced rapidly. Great monasteries were built, two 
school of Buddhism - the Sakyapa and the Kagyupa being the most 
popular. Social changes influenced political development and 
Buddhist monks became a new monastic aristocracy which successful-
ly challenged the traditional Tibetan nObility in social, political, and 
even economic fields. More than a spiritual or intellectual revival, 
the very nature of Tibetan society was changed: the social, economic, 
and political landscape was dramatically altered. Tibetan interests 
shifted away from political and military affairs toward religious and 
spiritual matters which over the succeeding centuries came to 
permeate the life of the Tibetan people. 
With this new, more pacific interest, the map drawn by Tibetan 
conquests began to contract. In both the south and the west, 
Tibetans were forced back to the Tibetan plateau, and subsequent 
Tibetan history would witness no expansion beyond this area. The 
Tibetan fighting spirit had been neutralized and the Tang Dynasty, 
though it was overthrown a century after the Tibetan ruling family 
fell, managed to recover most of the territory which had been taken 
from it by Tibet.6 
While Tibet endured the disintegration of its empire, it would 
soon face a threat to its independence in its remaining territory. That 
threat was the power of the Mongols under Genghis Kahn (1167-
1227). Following his election as the leader of all the Mongols, 
Genghis Khan made a series of rapid military conquests and created 
one of the greatest empires the world had ever known. While we do 
not need to go into detail regarding the extent of the Mongol 
conquests, suffice it to say that when Genghis conquered Tangut, a 
region to the north of Tibet, the Tibetan government decided to open 
friendly relations with the Mongols and introduced them Buddhism. 
The resulting accommodation established a 'priest/patron' relationship 
between the Mongol rulers and the Tibetan hierarchy. This agree-
ment became the basis for dealing with the Mongol Yuan Dynasty in 
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China (1260-1368), and later the Manchu Ching Dynasty (1644-1911) 
in China. 
By 1350, Changchub Gyaltsen (1350-1364) became the ruler of 
Tibet and helped to bring about further unification and centralization. 
He retained only a nominal bond between himself and the Mongol 
Emperor and attempted to revive secular rule and to effect a 
restoration of Imperial Tibet. He promoted the revival of Tibetan 
culture and adopted a Tibetan rather than the former Mongolian 
system of administration. His code of justice had far-reaching 
implications and was retained as the basis for the administration of 
Tibetan justice into the twentieth century. 
In spite of its physical isolation, international events continued to 
affect Tibet. As Mongol power waned, China came under the control 
of a native Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) which demonstrated little 
interest in Tibet. The Ming Emperors maintained trade and friendly 
relations with the Tibetans and viewed those relations in the 
Confucian context which meant acceptance of tributary relations 
between China and areas neighboring the Chinese Empire. There-
fore, it was considered normal and acceptable that the Tibetans, as 
subject people, paid monetary and economic tribute to their colonial 
masters. In spite of this relationship, Tibet remained free to maintain 
independent relations with Nepal and Kashmir. 
Mongol influence did not disappear from the area. Despite the 
decline of their once vast empire, the Mongols continued their ties 
with Tibet. Buddhist influence continued to grow in Tibet and 
Son am Gyatso (1534-1588), a Dalai Lama, traveled to the Mongol 
court and helped to set in motion the events which would bring about 
the conversion of the Mongols to Buddhism. The Fourth Dalai 
Lama, Yonten Guatso (1589-1617), was discovered to have been born 
to the family of the Mongol ruler Altan Khan, as his great-grandson. 
The Mongols subsequently helped to establish the rule of the Fifth 
Dalai Lama as the supreme religious and political power in Tibet.7 
The great regard for and power of the Dalai Lama over the 
Tibetan people is an extraordinary phenomenon and it is necessary 
to understand how this came about in order to fully appreciate his 
current role in Tibetan affairs. 
While some explanation of Buddhist beliefs will be found in the 
next section, a word should be offered here on the role of the Dalai 
Lama in Tibetan life. Tsonkapa (1357-1419) founded a new Tibetan 
Buddhist school as part of a reform movement. The Gelugpa was 
strictly a religious movement, but soon obtained political influence to 
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the extent of replacing what was at that time Tibet's dominant school, 
the Kagyupa. The Gelugpa school spread rapidly throughout Tibet 
and participated in the establishment of the largest and most 
powerful monasteries, the Ganden, Drepung, and Sera. When Gedun 
Trupa, the principal disciple of Tsonkapa, died in 1474, the popula-
tion believed that he was reincarnated in a newborn child, Gedun 
Gyatso (1474-1542). Gedun Trupa and Gedun Gyatso were posthu-
mously considered to be the First and Second Dalai Lamas, respec-
tively, and thus the forerunners of the supreme spiritual and temporal 
rulers of Tibet. The Tibet scholar, Michael C. van Walt van Praag, 
described the importance of this belief: 
The discovery of Gedun Trupa's rebirth and of all his subsequent 
rebirths as Dalai Lama was based on the belief that human beings 
who have attained a very high degree of enlightenment can 
reincarnate voluntarily and out of compassion, in order to help all 
living beings on their path to final liberation. The Dalai Lama 
was furthermore recognized to be the embodiment of Chenrezig 
(the Bodhisattva or emanation of compassion), and the protector 
of Tibet.8 
The Dalai Lamas had acquired significant power in Tibet by the 
end oftlle sixteenth century. The fifth incarnation, Ngawang Lobsang 
(1617-1682), known in history as the Great Fifth, found Tibet· 
immersed in religious and regional struggles and called upon Gushri 
Khan, his Mongol patron, for assistance. Mongol assistance resulted 
in victory and Gushri Khan presented the whole of Tibet to the Dalai 
Lama in 1642. This conquest enabled the Great Fifth to rule not 
only as the sovereign of a unified and independent state of Tibet, but 
also as the dominant head of the state religion. He retained this 
power until his retirement in 1679, when a Regent or Desi was 
appointed to administer the country in his name.9 This system of 
governance remained in force until modern times. 
The Tibetan Religious Heritage 
Any discussion of the religious heritage of Tibet must begin with 
the founding of Buddhism in India by Siddhattha Gautama, who was 
born in the year 563 B.C., and died in 483 B.c. Although he was the 
heir of the ruling house of Sakhas, he preferred to seek philosophical 
enlightenment. He renounced his princely authority to found the 
movement which emphasized compassion, wisdom, and the impor-
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tance of study and meditation. Following his death, his followers 
gathered to meditate on the "Words of the Enlightened One" and t~eir interpretation beca~e the nucleus of Buddhism. Subseq~ently 
hIS followers spread theIr teachings and established monasteries 
throughout southern and eastern Asia.lO 
The essentials of the teachings included the Four Noble Truths 
stated as follows: ' 
Life is inevitably sorrowful - birth, illness, age, and death are all 
unavoidable, and the quest is to find liberation from the suffering 
of this existence. 
This sorrow arises from the sensual cravings and desires that bind 
man to this existence and to the chain of rebirth. 
Lib~ration from t~is continued suffering perpetuated by constant 
rebtrth can be achIeved through ending this craving. 
Liberation can be obtained through proper moral conduct and 
enlightenment by following the Eightfold Path.ll 
The late Christmas Humphreys, who founded the Buddhist Society 
of London a~d became Vice-President of the Tibet Society, declared 
that "BuddhIsm was from the first a missionary religion." He noted 
that within a few days of the first sermon Buddha sent his converts 
into the world with the exhortation to proclaim the doctrine and 
preach "a life of holiness, perfect, and pure."l2 The Southern School 
(Theravede) develop~d in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Siam (Thailand), 
Burma, and Cambodia (Kampuchea), while the Mahayana School 
found its great expression in China, Mongolia, and Tibet. As to its 
growth, he described Buddhism as something which "spread like a 
tide in Asia.1f13 
B~ddhism spread along the trade routes to China, eventually 
reachmg Japan, Korea, and, in the sixth century, Tibet. While 
Theraveda stressed monastic discipline in applying the moral code, 
the Mahayana took a broader interpretation of the Buddhist beliefs. 
They incorporated the monastic principles of Theraveda but went 
beyond this to stress enlightenment for all beings through meditation. 
This form of Buddhism also stressed the concept of the bodhisattva 
an awakened being who reaches the state of enlightenment, then: 
when ready to leave the suffering of continued existence and enter 
Nirvan~, decides voluntari~y t.o be reborn again out of compassion for 
others m order to help theIr lIberation. This concept in Tibet became 
linked with the figures of living beings - the so-called Living Buddhas. 
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The bodhisattva is believed to possess the qualities of wisdom and 
compassion and those who trust in the guidance of the bodhisattva 
must share in the desire for liberation for other beings.14 
An important lesson in the study of international relations is that 
symbols playa crucial part in political struggles. A constant source 
for symbolic strength is religion. Major religions are known for their 
architectural monuments on earth, and just as the Vatican represents 
Catholicism, the Potala, the greatest Buddhist monastery in Tibet, 
symbolizes Tibetan Buddhism. This building, an important symbol in 
Tibet's struggle to preserve its national identity, lends a certain 
majesty and power to the Buddhist religious faith. One observer, 
Fred Ward, has described it as "the Magnificent Potala, the sprawling 
hilltop palace of the Dalai Lama." The palace is the citadel of 
Buddhist rule and, as the palace of the Dalai Lama, it dominates 
Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, in a "shroud of isolation." Tibet occupies 
the world's highest and most difficult terrain, a geographic feature 
which has kept it isolated for hundred of years after rival fiefdoms 
began to consolidate in the seventh century. The very name Lhasa, 
which means "Place of the Gods," notes Ward, became synonymous 
with the "Forbidden City".15 The Chinese Communists have turned 
this magnificent monastery into a museum, but it has retained its 
elegance. During China's Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-
1969), the Red Guards were expected to destroy it, but according to 
some accounts, it was saved from destruction by the intervention of 
then Premier Zhou Enlai and the regular Chinese army.16 A more 
recent visitor, traveler and author Peter Jennings, described the 
impression it made on him: 
For a Tibetan to see the Potala for the first time must be an 
experience which sends him to his knees. We were given the gift 
of experiencing this mighty Potala. You can't see it only. You 
have no choice but to feel it. It overpowers you. 
I've never been so overwhelmed by a building... Compared to the 
drab and dull-colored lands of Tibet, being in the Pot ala was like 
standing too close to a star. It was an overload of color. There 
was every shade of every color: red, blue, green, and so anY 
The great role religion plays in Tibetan culture and government is 
best realized by the Pot ala Palace, the headquarters for the Dalai 
Lama until he was forced to flee his homeland in 1959. The name 
Potata is adopted from the Sanskrit language and means "Buddha 
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Mountain." Its architecture is traditionally Tibetan. The first palace 
for the Dalai Lama was built in the seventh century, but was 
destroyed by lightning in the eighth century; its successor was 
devastated by war in the ninth century. The present palace dates 
from two major constructions in the seventeenth century. 
As most observers describe it, the Potala Palace dominates the 
landscape. The magnificence of the building is emphasized by its 
thirteen stories which give it a height of three hundred feet and a 
length from east to west of over one thousand feet. An estimated 
seven thousand workers labored daily on its construction. A crater 
behind the palace, which was the source of the mortar for the palace 
walls, was subsequently filled with water and designated the Dragon 
King Pool. Estimates indicate that the palace contains over one 
thousand rooms and about two thousand statues. This building thus 
represented an edifice of hallways, sulra libraries, beautifully 
decorated prayer rooms, and antechambers. Over the centuries this 
palace became the home of enormous treasures of silver, gold, and 
precious stone. IS 
The living quarters of the Dalai Lama were located at the top of 
the White Palace. The main structure was completed during the 
lifetime of the Great Fifth Lama and the adjoining Red Palace was 
finished after his death. The bedrooms, sitting rooms and the 
meeting rooms were all contained here, close to the room where the 
Dalai Lama sat while chanting the holy scriptures. The remains of 
the eight Dalai Lamas are entombed in gold stupas or rounded 
tombs. The stupa of the Fifth Dalai Lama rises some six stories in 
height and is covered by more than eight thousand pounds of gold.19 
Another palace which has great symbolic value and reflects the 
religious heritage of the Tibetan people is the Jokhang Temple. It is 
located in the center of the old city of Lhasa and was the scene of 
one of the major demonstrations against Communist oppression in 
late 1987. The Jokhang Temple is regarded by the Tibetans as one 
of the holiest of shrines and traces its founding back over thirteen 
hundred years. The architecture is not purely Tibetan, but reflects 
other styles and indicates the influence of Indian, Chinese, and 
Nepalese traditions. Throughout the day, pilgrims prostrate them-
selves before the shrine. One of its most impressive features is a 
gilded bronze statue of the Sakyamuni Buddha, sitting on a gold 
throne surrounded with pillars of pure silver.20 This temple has 
been described as "the Mecca to the Tibetan faithful." Some pilgrims 
have been known to travel for years to reach the building, circle it 
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and prostrate themselves repeatedly at body length intervals before 
entering to pray in front of the hundreds of statues inside. The 
building is characterized by its flickering yak butter candles, opulent 
painted Buddhist murals, great, thirty-foot high statues, richly woven 
cloth hangings, and the odor of burning butter which pervades the 
air.21 
The Drepung Monastery, yet another place of religious and 
symbolic significance, is located about six miles north of the city of 
Lhasa. This monastery, founded in 1416, is located high on a cliff 
and is built in the traditional Tibetan style. At one time, the 
monastery was the largest of the three great monasteries near Lhasa, 
and had a population of 10,000 students. The monastery is lavishly 
decorated and contains many statues of Buddha.22 
The Drepung Monastery, the Sera monastery, and the Ganden 
monastery are the three once great monasteries close to Lhasa. The 
Sera, three and half miles north of Lhasa, was founded in 1409 and 
was one of the most powerful monasteries in all of Tibet. It formerly 
possessed magnificent statues and great treasures from antiquity, but 
these were destroyed by the Communists after they took Tibet.23 
When they were founded, they were among the largest universities of 
the world. 
Summary 
The Dalai Lama, now in exile from his Tibetan homeland, 
describes the impact of Buddhism on Tibet as follows: 
In Tibet, we see all these aspects of practice as compatible; we do 
not view sutra and tantra as contradictory, like hot and cold; we do 
not consider that the practice of the view of emptiness and the 
practice of altruistic deeds are contradictory at all. As a result of 
this, we are able to combine all of the systems into a single unified 
practice. 
To summarize, the altruistic intention to become enlightened is 
the root, or basis, of the vast series of complete practices. The 
doctrine of emptiness is the root of the practices of the profound 
view. In order to develop the mind that realizes the suchness of 
phenomena higher and higher, it is necessary to engage in 
meditation. In order to achieve easily a meditative stabilization 
which is a union of calm abiding and special insight. As the basis 
for such practice it is necessary to keep good ethics. Thus, the 
complete system of practice in Tibet is explained as externally 
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maintaining the Low Vehicle system of ethics, internally maintain-
ing the Sutra Great Vehicle generation of altruism, love, compas-
sion, and secretly maintaining the practice of the Mantra Vehi-
cle.24 
25 
Under the Dalai Lama's rule, Tibet was characterized by a 
combination of the features of both religious and secular states, with 
a large proportion of its male population entering the monasteries. 
Although Tibet, because of its strategic location, was challenged by 
a number of the major powers in the twentieth century - Britain, 
Russia, China, and India - this remarkable religious-secular entity 
endured. It was not until the arrival of the Chinese Communists that 
the very existence of Tibet's ancient religious and cultural tradition 
was threatened. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Tibet Enters the Twentieth Century 
Tibet possessed a unique background as it entered the twentieth 
century. It had maintained cordial relations with the Chinese 
government under the rule of the Manchu Ching Dynasty (1644-
1911). A turning point was reached in the relationship in 1720 with 
the open intervention of the Chinese government in Tibetan affairs. 
When the Dzungar invaders attacked Tibet, the Dalai Lama asked for 
the assistance of the Chinese, and they responded by sending troops 
to expel the invaders. The Emperor of China acted as a patron and 
protector of Tibet by assisting the Dalai Lama and helping to restore 
effective administration in Lhasa. Tibet continued to conduct its own 
foreign relations, but Chinese influence increased each time the 
Chinese government intervened - 1728, 1750, and 1793. This series 
of interventions taken together constitutes the historical basis of 
China's current claim on Tibet. 
The 1793 arrangement was similar to a protectorate agreement. 
In 1792 a border dispute with the Gurkha rulers of Nepal led to a 
Gurkha invasion of Tibet and the Chinese troops joined with the 
Tibetan troops to drive them out. The Chinese Emperor issued an 
edict in 1793 introducing reforms and involved intervention by the 
Emperor in the religious offices of Tibet. The edict seemed to have 
little practical effect since it was ignored the next time a Dalai Lama 
was selected. In consequence, the year 1793 represented the apogee 
of Chinese influence in Tibet. By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century very little Manchu influence was evident. Tibet conducted 
battles against the Dogras and the Gurkhas in 1842 and 1856, 
respectively, and even concluded treaties with them without any 
intervention or assistance by the Chinese. There was a recognition 
of a normal role by China and by the Chinese Emperor. 
Other powers began to show an interest in Tibet. Britain, for 
example, attempted to gain influence in China through the treaties of 
1842 and sought to use them to gain access to Tibet through the 
Ching (Qing) Emperor. However, Britain then opened its own 
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Mission in Lhasa and, like Nepal, opened direct relations with Tibet. 
The Anglo-Tibetan treaty of 1904 sought to exclude other powers 
from Tibet, especially Russia, and sought to substantiate Britain's 
position among the Asian emperors. Treaties signe~ by Great Brit~in 
in 1906 and 1907 with the governments of Chma and RUSSia, 
respectively, modified some of the privileges Britain had secured from 
Tibet. 1 
Emergence into the Twentieth Century 
A significant change occurred for Tibet between 1911 and 1913 
which would affect its status for the next forty years. The Manchus 
invaded Tibet in 1910, and the Emperor denounced the Dalai Lama. 
The Dalai Lama in turn denounced the Chinese Emperor and broke 
all remaining ties. International law specialist Michael C. van Praag 
comments on the significance of events during the following years: 
The period from 1911 to 1913 saw the expUlsion of Imperial 
troops and officials from Tibet and the severance of ties with the 
Manchus· the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa and the reestab-
, . . 
lishment of effective control by hIS government; and the relIn-
quishment of Tibet's extreme isolationist policies in favor of close 
relations with Great Britain.2 
The year 1911 brought great upheaval in China with the overthrow 
of the Emperor and the imperial system which had characterized the 
Chinese government for over two thousand years. A new Republic 
of China was established and China began a process of government 
which bore a resemblance to Western-style democracy. The road was 
not easy. Warlordism and feudalism pervaded China, threatening 
chaos and China needed unification under an effective central 
gover~ment. The Chinese revolutionaries, under the leadership of 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the inspiration of his Three Principles of the 
People, undertook this task. 
Taking advantage of the disruption in China, the Dalai Lama 
proclaimed Tibet an independent state in January, 1913, and thus 
began a period in which the Dalai Lama and his regents exercised 
total control over Tibet, providing Tibet with a unique form of 
government which united the religious and the secular. In addition 
to an extensive civil service, Tibet now maintained an army of 10,000 
to 15,000 men, mainly deployed on the eastern borders with China, 
a judicial system which traced its origins back to the fourteenth 
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century, its own distinctive system of taxation, a telegraph and postal 
service, and its own currency.3 
Without going into excessive detail unrelated to the purpose of the 
current situation in Tibet, suffice it to say that during the period 
following the declaration of independence, the Dalai Lama initiated 
a wide-ranging reform in the land system, modifying a feudal land 
system which many Tibetans considered unfair. Money and postage 
stamps were introduced into the country. At a 1914 conference at 
Simla, India, to which Britain invited representatives from China and 
Tibet, the Chinese refused to recognize any measure of independence 
for Tibet. A Tibet-India boundary line was proposed by the British 
plenipotentiary Sir Henry McMahon, known as the McMahon line, 
was accepted by the British and Tibetans. India recognized it even 
after its independence, because it was favorable to India - but the 
Chinese refused to recognize it.4 
One of the areas of reform which enjoyed limited success in Tibet 
was the effort to modernize and strengthen the military, a change 
which became involved in factional and political struggles. The effort 
to reform the military began shortly after the turn of the century and 
reached its peak in the mid-1920s. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama 
recognized the importance of a strong military establishment to 
protect the border and culture of Tibet, but the failure of efforts to 
reconstruct Tibet's army became evident when the much stronger 
Chinese forces conquered Tibet in 1950 and reasserted control by 
military means in 1966. The real cause of this failure lay in a lack of 
communication, isolation, and a lack of time. Although rule by the 
religious leaders of Tibet caused some conflict with the military 
leaders in government, the foregoing factors were more important 
than any incompatibility between Tibetan Buddhism and a modern-
ized society.5 
Studies of international relations stress the importance of 
geography as a source of national power and the Tibetan case 
illustrates the truth of this proposition. The limited success of 
Tibetan military reform was, to a great extent, offset by geographic 
factors which worked against invading armies attempting to conquer 
Tibet. As Donald R. DeGlopper has observed, Tibet's "geography 
and climate made it a difficult and unwelcome environment in which 
to campaign." Maintaining an army in Tibet placed severe logistical 
strains on the invading state hoping to maintain its forces in that 
region. The prospects of extracting from Tibet's scattered and 
somewhat nomadic population sufficient revenue to maintain an army 
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were also limited. Even in the absence of the sort of violent guerrilla 
campaigns often encountered by invaders, forces entering Tibet found 
it extremely difficult to maintain a long-term presence.6 Consequent-
ly, most foreign interventions were limited simply because it wa.s such 
an expensive environment in which to operate. In sho~t, the Tlbetan 
experience is a clear illustration of the extent to whlch geography 
constitutes an important component of national power and strength-
ens the position of a relatively weak state such ~s Tibet. . 
The estrangement between China, undergomg a revolutIOnary 
change in government, and Tibet, attempting to establish its indepen-
dence came to an end with the restoration of relations between the 
Republic of China, unified by the Chinese Nationalist Party, and 
Tibet in 1929. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama welcomed an envoy sent 
from Tibet. The Nationalist government formally installed the 
Fourteenth Dalai Lama on February 22, 1940, and established a 
Tibetan Office when in August of 1949 the Panchen Lama was 
installed in office.7 
During the Second World War, Tibet attempted to maintain 
neutrality, but this neutrality was compromised wh~~ the Chin~se 
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, prompted by mIlitary neceSSIty, 
sought to build roads across Tibet despite Tibetan objections. The 
Chinese finally backed off and acceded to Tibetan objections.8 
The Chinese Nationalist government recognized the rights and 
privileges of the Tibetans and respected their u~ique sy~t~m of 
government, blending the spiritual and secular. -yv~llle not wlll~ng to 
recognize independence for Tibet, they were wlllmg to permIt the 
Tibetan system to survive within the Chinese sphere. I~ 19~6, 
Tibetan delegates participated in the conference the Nationahst 
Government called to draft a new constitution for the Republic of 
China. Special recognition for Tibet was provided in Article 12? of 
that document which declared: "The self-government system of TIbet 
shall be safeguarded."* 
The Communist Invasion 
The internal war in China between the Communists and the 
Nationalists continued after the conclusion ofthe Second World War 
and led to the victory of the Chinese Communists when they declared 
the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 
1949. The Chinese Nationalists left the mainland and established the 
Republic of China on Taiwan. However, the Chinese Natio?alists 
suffered defeats on the mainland throughout 1949. The TIbetan 
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government feared continued contact with the Nationalists would lead 
to a communist invasion of Tibet, and on July 20, 1949, the Tibetan 
Office of the Nationalist Chinese government was closed.9 However, 
this measure proved inadequate to protect them. 
. A warning of impending disaster came soon enough for the 
TIbetans. After only three months after the creation of the PRC a 
New ~ear's Day broadcast in 1950 from Radio Peking (Beijidg) 
proclaimed that the next task was the liberation of Taiwan Hainan 
and Tibet. The propaganda was followed by assertions that Tibet wa~ 
"an integral part of Chinese territory," and that since Tibet had fallen 
under the control of foreign imperialists it had to be "liberated" in 
order to secure the western borders of China.lO Scholar and Tibetan 
expert John F. Avedon described the tragic situation the Tibetans 
faced: 
Though the language was novel, the implications were clear. With 
four decades in which to have prepared defenses now lost Lhasa 
finally moved to protect itself. The Tibetan government' turned 
first to the army. Since the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's death its 
improvement had been ignored. No more than a glorified border 
patrol, the 8,500 troops possessed fifty pieces of artillery and only 
a few hundred mortars and machine guns. Enlisted men often 
traveled in the company of their wives and children; officers, 
pr.i~arily nob~e officials on brief tours of duty, had no prior 
mtlltary expenence. Nevertheless, fresh troops and ammunition 
were soon deployed to a thin chain of garrison towns lining the 
western bank of the Upper Yangtze River, Tibet's de facto border 
with China. Both the men and their commanders were confident 
that, with the aid of the country's greatest natural asset, its lofty 
ranges, they could hold off the seasoned troops of the PLA 
(People's Liberation Army). 11 
Tibet embarked upon a diplomatic initiative seeking support from 
India, Nepal, Great Britain, and the United States. The result was 
disappointment as each turned away the Tibetan plea. Only India 
had official diplomatic relations with Tibet and since the PRC did not 
rec?gnize autonomy for Tibet, it declined to assist its neighbor. 
Chma assured India it had no intention of using force against Tibet. 
However, by early spring, the People's Liberation Army began its 
move toward Tibet. In the 1951 May Day broadcast, Radio Peking 
stressed that only Taiwan and Tibet remained to be liberated. The 
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Chinese Communists promised regional autonomy for Tibet and 
religious freedom if it would agree to be liberated peacefully, but the 
real intentions of the Chinese were soon revealed. A few days after 
this message the PLA launched an attack across the Yangtze River 
and captured the poorly defended town of Dengkog.12 
Almost one year after the successful conquest of the Chinese 
mainland, an estimated 40,000 the Chinese Communist troops on 
October 7, 1950, crossed into Tibet at eight points on the border, and 
attacked on the provincial capital of Chamdo. The Tibetan troops, 
inferior in training to the seasoned Chinese force and overwhelmed 
by the number of Chinese Communist troops, met defeat. The 
Tibetan forces numbered only 8,000. They fought valiantly, but 
within the first two weeks, about 4,000 Tibetan officers and men were 
killed and the rest were forced to surrender. The attack shocked the 
world, but especially the Indians who had been assured and believed 
the assurance that China would not attack Tibet. India protested the 
invasion and its protest was endorsed by Britain and the United 
States. The latter informed India of its desire to help Tibet, but 
India discouraged any supply of military aid to Tibet and, in effect, 
washed its hands of the Tibetan situation, purposely seeking a 
diplomatic solution. Prime Minister Nehru acknowledged, to the 
disappointment of the Tibetans: 
We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very 
attempts to save it might bring greater trouble to it. It would be 
unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without 
having the capacity to help her effectivelyY 
The PRC was not seeking conciliation. It brazenly accused India 
and other powers of harboring expansionist designs on Tibet and 
attempting to interfere in the domestic affairs of China. Communist 
Beijing proclaimed that it was exercising a sovereign right to "liberate" 
Tibet and drive out foreign powers in order to guarantee regional 
autonomy and religious freedom for the Tibetans. The PRC warned 
against any foreign intervention to assist the Tibetan people.14 
Communist Control Over the Tibetans 
Following this military victory, the People's Republic of China 
moved in swiftly to exert control over Tibet. Even the more 
pessimistic observers did not realize the full extent of the intention of 
the Chinese Communists in taking over this ancient civilization. 
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The Dalai Lama remained in Lhasa, risking his own life to seek 
a peaceful transition for his people. In November of 1950, the 
brother of the Dalai Lama, Takster Rinpoche, who had been held 
prisoner, arrived in Lhasa. He revealed to the Dalai Lama a scheme 
in which the Chinese Communist governor of Xining sought to enlist 
his support to overthrow his brother, the Dalai Lama, in return for 
which the Chinese would make him the governor general of all of 
Tibet. The government of Tibet now became aware of the full intent 
ofthe PRC plans: a plan to annex Tibet and dismantle its secular and 
religious government. Further depressing news reached the Tibetan 
government: the United Nations had declined to take up the case of 
Tibet.ls 
The situation became more desperate as the PRC revealed its 
decisions to act as a conquering power fully subjugating the people 
of Tibet. The Tibetan Cabinet sent a delegation to Peking (Beijing) 
to negotiate with China in the hope of preserving some measure of 
freedom for Tibet. This delegation arrived in the Chinese capital 
during the last week of April in 1951. Premier Zhou Enlai presented 
them with a ten-point plan indicating that Tibet was a part of China 
and had been peacefully liberated. The Tibetan government 
representatives refused to sign these documents and a stalemate 
resulted. The PRC representatives were then presented with a new 
Seventeen Point Agreement, without allowing any discussion. The 
PRC threatened them with physical harm and a total military 
occupation of Tibet unless they signed; the Tibetan delegates were 
held captive, and agreed to sign without the authorization or approval 
from the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Cabinet. 
The Seventeen Point Agreement was a formula for disaster for 
Tibet. Tibet lost its identity as a nation-state. A careful reading of 
the document tells much about the aggressive nature of the PRC 
regime and its lack of respect for the culture and the rights of the 
Tibetan people. The opening section was perfectly in line with the 
Maoist interpretation of the aggression committed against Tibet: 
"The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive 
forces from Tibet so that the Tibetan people shall return to the big 
family of the motherland - the People's Republic of China." 
The rest of the agreement called for the dismantling of the 
defenses of Tibet and its incorporation into the Maoist Empire. The 
agreement specified that the local government of Tibet should 
actively cooperate in assisting the People's Liberation Army in 
consolidating the "national defenses." Referring to the policy toward 
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nationalities by the PRC, the agreement spoke of Tibet exercising the 
right of national autonomy under the unified leadership of the 
communist government. The agreement went on to give paper 
assurances that the position of the Dalai Lama and the structure of 
government would be maintained (Le., "The religious beliefs, customs 
and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and lama 
monasteries shall be protected"). However, a provision in the 
agreement provided for the dismantling of the Tibetan army, and its 
combination into the People's Liberation Army, thus making it part 
of the national defense forces of the PRe. 
The heavy hand of the PRC stretched over Tibetan affairs with the 
provision that, in order to assure its implementation, the central 
government of China would establish a military and administrative 
committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet. The govern-
ment in Beijing would control "the centralized handling of all external 
affairs of the area of Tibet," and there would be "peaceful coexis-
tence" with other countries.16 
The Dalai Lama, only sixteen years of age at the time, fled the 
country, but returned eight months later (August, 1951) to try to 
work out a settlement with the Chinese and protect the few freedoms 
remaining for his people. 
The Maoist government played a skillful diplomatic and political 
game. After the agreement was signed May 28, 1951, the next steps 
appeared puzzling especially for those not familiar with the devious 
nature of communist conquests. The Chinese continued to promise 
religious freedom, made lavish gifts to the nobility, banned the use of 
a Chinese term for the Tibetans which Tibetans had found offensive 
(i.e., man-tze meaning 'barbarian'), and promised to help the 
modernization of Tibet with new hospitals, schools and roads. The 
official propaganda pamphlets and publications talked of driving 
"imperialists" out of Tibet. (Prior to the invasion, notes John 
Avedon, there had been only six Westerners in Tibet, all of whom 
had left.) The Communist rulers of China welcomed Tibet back to 
the "the Motherland.,,17 
Yet, when the events were fully played out, it was obvious that the 
Tibetans were simply the victims of one of the many colonial power 
plays so common in Asia. They were occupied by a foreign army and 
their culture and religion were under a systematic attack. Efforts to 
resist the imposition of a destructive colonial administration had 
eventually led to the deaths of approximately 400,000 Tibetans who 
wanted to preserve their nation's independence. In commenting on 
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these events, Takster Rinpoche, the brother of the Dalai Lama, 
observed that in the beginning "they put their words like honey on a 
knife. But we could see that, if you lick the honey, your tongue will 
be CUt."18 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Consolidation of Chinese Control 
The control exercised over Tibet by the Chinese Communists after 
their military conquest soon began to undermine the government and 
religious practices of the Tibetan people. The years 1951 through 
1959 saw an attempt by the Tibetans to make the best of a bad 
situation, but the oppression had so worsened by the latter part of 
this period that new riots broke out and the Dalai Lama was again 
forced to flee and to go into exile. Meanwhile the PRC continued its 
efforts to remake Tibet in the Communist image. 
A crucial component of a nation's identity is its social and political 
culture. As a starting point in its effort to transform Tibet, Chinese 
authorities focused upon the Tibetan social and cultural system. The 
extent of the destruction of traditional Tibetan culture requires an 
understanding of what Tibet was like when the PRC seized control. 
The previous chapter has outlined Tibet's history and has demonstrat-
ed the intricate relationship between religion and government in 
Tibet, giving special attention to the important role played by the 
Dalai Lama. 
Government in Tibet 
The Dalai Lama represented the nominal apex of the Tibetan 
governmental system. There were two prime ministers who repre-
sented a combination of both monastic and lay authority, the two 
types of authority held by the Dalai Lama. One prime minister was 
a monk and the other was a lay person. Most of the offices below 
them were held by other religious and lay officials. The Cabinet of 
Tibet contained four members including one monk and three lay 
persons. Falling below the Cabinet one found two separate offices. 
The Secretariat (Yin-tsang), headed by four monks, was in charge of 
religious affairs and was directly responsible to the Dalai Lama, and 
the Finance Office (Tse-khang), which was under the direction of 
four lay persons and directed the lay functions of state. Either two 
or three chairmen carried on the other functions of government: 
agriculture, foreign affairs, taxation, posts and telegraphs, and 
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defense. The court system was headed by two chief justices. 
Tibet also had an operating legislative branch known as the 
National Assembly. The National Assembly was usually continuously 
in session, comprising a total of about twenty officials - the eight 
officials from the Secretariat and the Finance Office, other high lay 
officials, as well as representatives of the three great monasteries near 
Lhasa. The Assembly had the power to convene a larger assembly of 
thirty members to deal with major problems. The largest assembly 
included some four hundred top officials and dealt with matters of 
prime importance, such as the discovery of a new incarnation of the 
Dalai Lama. 
The monasteries played an important role in the political and 
religious life of Tibet. Although exact figures may be difficult to 
verify, about ten percent of the population may have been monks or 
nuns. Entry into the monasteries was facilitated by the fact that 
young boys, from the age of six or seven, could enter the monasteries. 
The monasteries were also open to people from all social classes and, 
as a result, the monastic orders were not limited to a narrow stratum 
of society. The monasteries varied greatly in terms of size and 
possessions. Most raised their own food and maintained craftsmen 
to take care of their needs. A few owned large amounts of land, 
while others engaged in trade or money-lending. However, most of 
the monasteries had to rely on subsidies from the government, paid 
for by taxes raised from the lay population.1 
The Dalai Lama has been forthright in admitting some of the 
problems which contributed to Tibet's difficulties when faced with the 
communist threat. These problems included: the army, Tibet's 
geographical and diplomatic isolation, and the religious philosophy 
which isolated Tibet from international ties. As mentioned earlier 
the reforms scheduled for the military forces collapsed as a result of 
factional struggles. The Dalai Lama noted that the Tibetan army was 
small, its main purpose being to prevent foreigners from illegally 
crossing the frontier. As a result, it had never been mechanized and 
consequently, it was ill-prepared to resist China's military pressures: 
Nations may adopt anyone of several orientations toward world 
politics. The role of Tibet was one of isolationism. This isolationist 
policy played a role in Tibet's difficulties: it had adopted isolationism 
because this appeared appropriate to its geographic position. Tibet 
had chosen to keep foreigners out as a way of avoiding internal 
tensions that it feared might result from an influx of people with a 
different value system. Tibetans felt that holding themselves entirely 
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aloof from the world was "the best way of ensuring peace" but, in 
retrospect, the policy proved "a mistake." Even when Tibet declared 
its independence in 1912, the country so preferred its traditional 
isolation that it did not seek to send ambassadors to other countries 
or, later, to join either the League of Nations or the United Na-
tions. 2 
The Buddhist faith was one of peace and non-violence, and in 
accord with this belief, the Dalai Lama hoped to persuade the 
Chinese peacefully to fulfill their promises. He noted the dilemma 
which resulted from this policy: 
Nonviolence was the only course which might win us back a 
degree of freedom in the end, perhaps after years of patience. 
That meant cooperation whenever it was possible, and passive 
resistance whenever it was not. And violent opposition was not 
only unpractical, it was also unethical. Nonviolence was the only 
moral course. This was not only my own profound belief, it was 
also clearly in accordance with the teaching of Lord Buddha, and 
as the religious leader of Tibet I was bound to uphold it. We 
might be humiliated, and our most cherished inheritances might 
seem to be lost for a period, but if so, humility must be our 
portion. I was certain of that.3 
A discussion of the role of government deserves a reference to the 
role of the Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama, similar to the Dalai 
Lama, is recognized as an incarnation. The position stretches back 
as far as the fourteenth century. The Panchen Lama was recognized 
as second in authority to the Dalai Lama in religious authority but, 
unlike the Dalai Lama, held no secular authority. While there has 
been a close relationship historically, a split occurred in the twentieth 
century, with a rift developing in 1910 at the time of the invasion by 
Manchu China. The Panchen Lama left to live in Chinese-controlled 
territory, where he remained until his death in 1937. In 1950, the 
Communist regime in Beijing brought forth a candidate whom they 
claimed was a reincarnation of the Panchen Lama and insisted that 
this candidate be accepted or the negotiations of 1951 would be at 
risk. Gradually, the PRC government won the acceptance of their 
candidate.4 It then brought pressure on the Panchen Lama to 
denounce the Dalai Lama, which he refused to do; the Panchen 
Lama assumed a more important role in Tibet under Chinese 
Communist influence after the Dalai Lama left the country in 1959.5 
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Communist Consolidation of Power 
After their military conquests, the Chinese Communists decided 
to consolidate their position in Tibet. The result was military 
domination by the PRC, even to the point of incorporating the 
Tibetan army into the PRC's People's Liberation Army. The Chinese 
tried to assign to the Panchen Lama the temporal affairs of govern-
ment, but the Dalai Lama rejected this proposal, although he agreed 
to the PRC's Panchen Lama return to Tibet to exercise the tradition-
al religious role of that office. The PRC, in the meantime, took 
control of all the external affairs of Tibet.6 
Beijing had sent in military forces. These were followed by 
Chinese civilians, including propaganda workers (with printing presses 
and loud-speakers), tradesman and entertainers. More and more 
Chinese settlers arrived, taking over the better houses and the better 
shops. It appeared the PRC was attempting to populate Tibet with 
Chinese Communists. As the traveler and commentator, Lowell 
Thomas Jr., noted that "the Chinese, however, were committing 
imperialist aggression on the excuse of opposing imperialist aggres-
sion."7 
The Tibetans adopted passive resistance as a means to frustrate 
the aims and objectives of the Communist rulers, and the PRC 
government soon realized that they were failing in their program to 
"communize" Tibet. The Tibetans even submitted petitions through 
the Chinese officials complaining that the Chinese had claimed they 
had entered Tibet to drive out the imperialist aggressors and that the 
imperialist aggressors had obviously been driven out. Therefore, the 
petitions concluded, it was time for the Chinese armies to withdraw, 
since their assistance was no longer needed. The Communists 
officials were infuriated by this action and threatened to remove from 
political office any Tibetan officials who refused to take action against 
the people who submitted the petitions.8 
The Chinese then sought to strengthen communications between 
China and Tibet to facilitate more effective control. They connected 
telegraph wires by 1953 to the major cities and began a program of 
road and airfield construction. After signing an agreement with India 
in 1954, the PRC took over the old communications system estab-
lished by the British, and maintained by Indians after Indian 
independence.9 This action effectively ended Indian influence over 
the Tibetan media and placed the Chinese in a position of complete 
media dominance. 
The next step included the strengthening of administrative control, 
r 
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giving the Chinese more power over the bureaucratic structure which 
controlled the country. The PRC altered the office of the dzongpon, 
an official who headed a local governmental unit called a dzong, 
similar to a county. The dzongpon lost what could have been a 
lifetime position; it became, instead, a term of three or four years. 
New dzongpon were appointed who were permitted to perform their 
functions only in consultation with the Chinese military officials. 
These dzongpon no longer reported to the Dalai Lama, as in the 
traditional system of government, but were subservient to the Chinese 
military forces. A secret society, the Mimang or "People's Party," was 
formed by innovative Tibetans and served to bypass the Chinese-
controlled dzongs in order to bring their concerns and grievances 
directly to the Dalai Lama. Although it lacked formal authority, it 
did represent a protest movement among the Tibetans to bypass and 
isolate the Chinese-controlled dzongpon. The Chinese attempted to 
destroy the Mimang by jailing its leaders, by seeking to bribe its 
members, and by propaganda attacks on the organization, which 
continued to resist Communist control and reflected Tibetan desire 
for freedom.lO 
The Maoist conquerors also introduced measures to reduce the 
role of the monasteries in Tibetan religious and governmental life. 
The Chinese Military District Headquarters in Lhasa established a 
new Public Security Department and issued an order prohibiting the 
Drepung Monastery from its ancient role of maintaining order in 
Lhasa during the traditional Great Prayer Festival of the New Year. 
The streets were now patrolled by Tibetan and Chinese soldiers; any 
monks who were arrested were held by the military and turned over 
to civil authorities for trial only after the festival. l1 
While the monks resisted these new controls, the Communists also 
encountered resistance from the working class. They resented the 
Chinese control and the fall in wages which resulted, especially for 
road-building crews, after the Maoists took over. The PRC forces 
resorted to conscript labor with enormous requirements, namely 
seven thousand Tibetans to work on the Lhasa airport, twenty-
thousand for one road building project, and five thousand to clear 
timber for a Chinese rest camp. Contrary to traditional practice, 
where conscript labor was used for a local project with limited time, 
the Chinese program engaged large numbers of Tibetans and sent 
these to far distant places for long periods, with limited rations, low 
wages, and the requirement that they even work on Buddhist 
holidays. The Maoists brought heavy pressure on the Tibetan 
42 Tibet: Endurance of the National Idea 
officials to provide labor to fill their unreasonable ",:ork dema~~sY 
A major objective of Beijing's policy was the socml ~n? poh~lcal 
transformation of all minority regions that were to be aSSImIlated mto 
the PRe. Authorities recognized that Tibetan societ~ had a strong 
family orientation and, therefore, the Chinese officmls mo;ed to 
break this bond.' They opened government schools ostensIbly to 
combat the problem of illiteracy, but the Tibetans soon found. that 
their children were forced to learn the Chinese language, Chmese 
Communist Party doctrines, and that traditional Tibetan culture was 
attacked in the new classrooms. The Communists establis~ed "youth 
centers," beginning in 1953, at least two in eacl~ dzon~, wIth sports, 
theaters, game rooms, etc. designed to entIce Tibetan y?uth. 
Communist Party cadres taught the Tibetan youth the Chmese 
Communist songs (e.g., "Mao Zedong, T~n Tho~sand Years") and 
required them to participate in study seSSIOns on Mao ~setung and 
Chinese Policies Toward Minorities" and "Mona~tenes A~ An 
Obstacle to Progress." The Chinese encouraged the TIbet~n chIldren 
to apply to go to China, and thousands were sent to Chma where, 
separated from their parents and their Tibetan culture, they ",:ere 
educated to become communists who would later be the cadres m a 
"new" Tibet.13 • 
The Communists especially focused on young monks, trym~ to 
wean them away from true Buddhism. Lowell Thomas, Jr. descnbes 
the methods used by the PRC on the monastic students: 
[M]onasteries had much to resist. Their own children - ~he young 
student monks - were primary targets of the Commumst propa-
ganda. In a barrage of talks and pamphlets these young men ",:ere 
told of an exciting new religion. It was called Buddha-MarxIsm; 
it was described as a good way and an easier way. It did not 
demand the rigid behavior standards of the reformed sects of 
Lamaism. All young men were encouraged to enj07 the ~o.od 
things of life. Leave the monasteries, marry, and raIse famihes, 
the pamphlets suggested; forget. the stodgy reli~ious books and 
contribute to the progress of TIbet, part of Chma. p: Bu?dh~­
Marxist could drink wine, eat fine food, and have SlIver m hIS 
pockets. Why should the fine young men of Ti?et. be slaves to 
the higher priesthood - to which they could obtam, If lucky, only 
in their own old age?14 
The Communists kept up propaganda techniques designed to 
r 
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undermine the Tibetan system and bring greater cooperation between 
Tibetans and the Communists. Films were shown of happy Tibetan 
families enjoying a new home and a better life because they were 
cooperating with the Chinese Communist officials. When the films 
were shown in eastern Tibet, the Tibetans were told that it was a 
western Tibetan family enjoying these benefits; when the films were 
shown in western Tibet, they were told this was the story of a family 
in eastern Tibet. The lamas in the monasteries did their best to 
protect the people and inform them of the truth. Consequently, the 
Chinese Communists realized that despite their efforts the Tibetans 
were still resisting Communism, and that the greatest obstacle was the 
moral leadership of the Dalai Lama.1s 
A New Government for Tibet 
While the situation in Tibet had many features which distinguished 
it from the condition of other non-Han Chinese people under Maoist 
control, the PRC included Tibet within its policies for the treatment 
of "national minorities." Such minorities ranged from those which 
had no written language of their own, and were considered backward 
socially and politically, to people like the Tibetans, who possessed 
highly developed, age-old literary cultures, with their own language. 
It is difficult to determine the ethnic backgrounds of the PRC's 
monks. Most, of course, are drawn from one of the fifty-five separate 
peoples recognized by Chinese scholars but others may be drawn 
from among the ranks of perhaps as many as five hundred distinctive 
groups recognized by ethnologists who have studies the ethnic 
composition of Asia. Such an ethnic mosaic, however, defies efforts 
to place the Tibetans in a clear context. A much more direct 
classification has been provided by Alain Y. Dessaint, a specialist on 
Chinese demography, who maintains that a more general categoriza-
tion of the regions minorities reveals the existence of only four major 
ethnolinguistic categories. The inhabitants of China's western and 
southwestern regions, especially the Tibetan plateau, are classified as 
Tibetans. 
The PRC established a special governmental structure to rule the 
"minorities" peoples, an arrangement which included five autonomous 
regions, thirty-one autonomous prefectures, and one hundred and 
four autonomous counties. This structure was established in 1952 
under the "General Program for the Implementation of Regional 
Autonomy for Nationalities." These "autonomous" areas are now 
governed under the new "Law on Regional Autonomy for Minorities," 
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which went into effect on October 1, 1984.16 
The obseIVer must be willing to read beyond the words of the 
Communist documents to obtain their true meaning. While the law 
in Article 10 states that minorities should enjoy the freedom of using 
and developing their own spoken and written language as well as 
having the freedom to maintain customs and habits, the same article 
speaks of the freedom to change customs, a euphemism for forced 
Maoist "sinification" and communization of the Tibetans. The law 
states that a proportion of minority members will be considered in 
making that percentage a part of the governing unit. These "autono-
mous" regions are to possess some degree of authority to adopt 
directives relating to local conditions in modification of directives 
issued for the Chinese population in China proper. However, the 
final power to interpret the central government's directives remains 
with the National People's Congress of the PRCY 
Despite the argument that their policy was based on equality, 
unification, autonomy, and prosperity for minorities, the PRC's 
actions brought great hardship for those, who, like the Tibetans, 
hoped to see the endurance of their national identify by preseIVing 
their culture and religion. While some material benefits have 
resulted, such as roads, economic development, etc., the price has 
been a loss of autonomy and of the finer, more vital elements of this 
old and distinctive culture. The first decade of Chinese control over 
Tibet brought great difficulties until a period of revolt led to a further 
crackdown and the flight of the Dalai Lama. 
Movement Toward the 1959 Crisis 
The Dalai Lama sought to minimize the difficulties brought on 
Tibet by the Chinese conquest. The first great crisis came within the 
first nine months when the Chinese troops moving into Lhasa 
demanded additional food rations. The Chinese had initially 
demanded a "loan" of two thousand tons of barley from the Tibetans, 
a demand which strained the meager resources in the Tibetan capitol. 
However, a subsequent demand for a further two thousand tons 
brought disaster to the Tibetan economy. Food shortages resulted 
and prices increased greatly. For the first time in its long history, the 
Tibetans faced famine. The Tibetan people, as they were to do again 
in 1959, in the late 1980s, and the early 1990s, protested strongly.18 
The progressive move toward a Maoist China brought Tibet into 
yet greater crises. The 1951 agreement had seriously compromised 
Tibet, and forced its incorporation into the Maoist system. The 
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g~owing number of PRC military stationed in Tibet, the sending of 
TIbetan youth for re-education in China, the "reform" of Tibetan local 
government, the conscription of labor and the reduction in the 
authority of the monasteries all helped the PRC to increase its 
control over Tibet. 
In 1954, the Dalai Lama left Tibet on his first visit outside his 
country, to go to China to meet with Mao Zedong hoping to alleviate 
h~s count~'~ plight. While the Dalai Lama was in Beijing, Mao told 
hIm he ongmally expected to govern Tibet direct from the Chinese 
capital, b~t he was considering an alternative "Preparatory Committee 
for the TIbet Autonomous Region." The governing unit would have 
fifty-one members, with forty-six Tibetans and five non-Tibetans. The 
Dalai Lama would seIVe as chairman, and the Panchen Lama with a 
Chinese official would seIVe as vice-chairmen. The group would set 
up subcommittees for religious and lay governance, similar to the 
Secretariat and the Finance Office of the traditional Tibetan 
government. The PRC sought to give secular authority to the 
Panchen Lam~. All appointees had to be approved by the Chinese 
government, m effect the proposal constituted a violation of the 
Chinese promise not to alter the government of Tibet.19 
While visiting Beijing, the Dalai Lama obtained a clear indication 
of the true Chinese attitude and intentions during his final inteIView 
with Mao. Mao told him that he understood him well, but added: 
Religion is poison. It has two great defects: It undermines the 
race, and se~ondly it retards the progress of the country. Tibet 
and Mongoba have both been poisoned by it.20 
While visiting China, he found the attack against religion in full 
force. The Chinese Buddhist monasteries and temples were neglected 
and alm?st e~pty; monks in the monasteries were old and the young 
were bemg dIscouraged from entering. The Tibetan leader realized 
that the PRC pro~ise of religious freedom for the Tibetan people 
was an empty promIse. He obseIVed later that destruction was likely 
to be the fate of the entire religious community of Tibet. 21 
The full impact of the Chinese communist policies was also 
beginni~g to be felt i~ Tibet. Changes imposed by relatively peaceful 
means m Central TIbet were now being imposed by force in the 
r~gions. of Kham and Amdo. By 1955, groups of the People's 
Liberatl.on A~~y traveled throughout the country, disarming the 
population, seIzmg personal possessions, and bringing about collectiv-
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ization. Many Tibetans in the remote vi11a~es resisted, an? the ~RC 
retaliated by bringing more and more Chmese settlers l~to Tlbet. 
The Dalai Lama strove to bring about a peaceful resolutlOn of the 
difficulties. When he traveled to New Delhi in February of 1957, 
Mao announced that Tibet was not yet ready for reform and they 
would be postponed for a minimum of six years. However, the 
situation in Tibet had become worse. Although the People's 
Liberation Army had virtually laid Kham waste, the resistance forces 
continued their efforts.22 
The brutality and cruelty of the PRC's actions shocked ~eutral 
observers, although the complete story did not come o~t until seve~al 
years after the event. An investiga~io~ by the InternatlOnal CO~~lS­
sion of Jurists a human rights momtonng group of lawyers and Junsts 
from fifty nations, revealed the full extent of the situation wh~ch the 
Dalai Lama and the people of Tibet had had to face. The reslstance 
was so intense that one estimate stated that the PRC forces lost 
40,000 troops between 1956 and 1958. J~hn Avedo~ ~ccuses the 
Chinese Communists of letting "loose a senes of atrocltIes unparal-
leled in Tibet's history," and summed up the conclusions in the report 
of the International Jurists: 
The obliteration of entire villages was compounded by hun~r~ds 
of public executions, carried out .to intimidat~. t~e su,rvlVlng 
population. The methods employed m~luded cm.clfIXlon, dlsme.m-
berment, vivisection, beheading, burym~, burmn~ and scaldmg 
alive, dragging the victims to death behmd gallopmg horses an~ 
pushing them from airplanes; children were forced to shoot th~lr 
parents disciples their religious teachers. Everywhere monastenes 
were p:ime targets. Monks were compelled to pub~icly copulate 
with nuns and desecrate sacred images before bemg sent to a 
growing string of labor camps in Amdo and Gansu.23 
The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa to find a critical situation. The 
city was surrounded by tents which housed over ten t~ousa~d 
refugees. By June of 1958, the revolt had reached Central Tlbe~ wlth 
the formation of an army to resist the Chinese. The brutahty of 
Chinese troops intensified in order to suppress the revolt.24 • 
The year 1959 proved a difficult and pivotal ~ea~ for the Dal~l 
Lama and the Tibetans as the Chinese Commumsts mcreased thelr 
pressure on Tibet. In essence, it spelled the demise of the hopes of 
the Dalai Lama that he could protect his people and his country by 
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appealing to the Chinese through peaceful and non-violent means. 
The Dalai Lama would learn what so many other governments have 
learned, Communists have specific objectives and cannot be expected 
or trusted to deviate from them. 
The New Year celebration heralding the year of the earth pig 
brought thousands of Tibetan monks and lay people to Lhasa in 
February of 1959. By March, tensions had increased with the arrival 
of a new Chinese army division in Lhasa and rumors that the Chinese 
were planning to take the Dalai Lama to Beijing. One rumor that 
circulated had the Chinese Communists taking the Dalai Lama to 
attend the Second National People's Congress, which was scheduled 
to open in Beijing in April of 1959. 
Faced with oppression and rumors of the forced removal of the 
Dalai Lama, over 30,000 Tibetans began a protest. They put up anti-
Communist posters and marched to the office of the Indian Consul-
ate General to appeal for help from India. The Chinese troops 
brutally suppressed the demonstration and opened fire on the 
Tibetans, killing numbers of them.25 As was evident in the demon-
strations of 1987 and 1988, the Chinese did not hesitate to use force 
against defenseless monks and civilians to enforce their authority. 
No sooner had this demonstration been put down by the Chinese 
that another rumor alarmed the people. The Dalai Lama had been 
ordered by the Chinese to attend a cultural program but was told to 
go without his guards. This directive seemed to confirm the existence 
of a plot to kidnap the Tibetan religious leader. Crowds estimated 
at up to ten thousand people surrounded the Dalai Lama to prevent 
him from being taken away, and the crowd formed its own guard unit 
to protect him. The Tibetans had again taken to the streets and the 
Chinese troops again opened fired on them, killing or wounding a 
number of demonstrators. 
The desire for independence and freedom grew stronger among 
the Tibetans. During the March 12 demonstration, the 1951 treaty 
was repudiated. This treaty had supposedly granted Tibet autono-
mous status within the PRC, but had in actuality taken away its 
freedom and attempted to alter its government, a fact now recognized 
by most Tibetans. This agreement, which had been imposed on the 
Tibetans, had effectively resulted in the Chinese Communists taking 
control over both the internal and external affairs of Tibet. Faced 
with a continuing clamor for independence, the Chinese Communists 
blamed "reactionaries" in the Tibetan government and Western 
"imperialists" for the unrest, and conveniently ignored the real 
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demand of the Tibetans for independence and freedom from 
Communist-style "liberation." 
Beijing neither remained passive nor sought a peaceful accommo-
dation. More PRC troops began to pour into Tibet, and some even 
surrounded the Potala, the palace of the Dalai Lama. In order to 
assert their authority, the Chinese troops fired shells at the sacred 
palace. 
The situation required a quick decision by the Tibetan leadership. 
The Tibetans sought continued resistance to the PRC while sparing 
no effort to avoid the capture of the Dalai Lama by the Communists. 
Dressed in disguise, and mingling unnoticed with the crowd outside, 
the Dalai Lama successfully executed the plan for his escape. 
Meeting with other Tibetan officials outside the city of Lhasa, he and 
his entourage began a long march out of Tibet - through difficult 
mountain terrain, and with the constant need to avoid the Chinese 
Communist patrols. 
Back in Lhasa, Tibetan demonstrations and resistance, which 
started on March 17, put the Chinese Communists on the defensive, 
providing a convenient cover for the escape of Dalai Lama. Two 
days later, when the Chinese realized that the Dalai Lama had 
escaped, their troops shelled the palace and began a repressive 
campaign against the local population, seeking to obtain information 
about the escape of the Dalai Lama in the hope of recapturing him. 
Troops armed with modern military equipment were dispatched to 
patrol the border to prevent the Dalai Lama's escape. The Commu-
nists sought to seal off all possible escape routes, but the Tibetans 
had scored against the Chinese. The Dalai Lama and his party of 
two hundred successfully avoided surveillance by planes during the 
day and by Chinese troop patrols at night, and completed a journey 
of over two hundred miles to cross the India border in only two 
weeks.26 
The Chinese troops took five days to suppress the rebellion in 
Lhasa, despite the use of harsh and brutal tactics. The city had 
suffered much damage, with the two great monasteries of Drepung 
and Sers in flames. The Maoists established a military control 
committee over Lhasa, and imposed a dark-to-dawn curfew.27 
Resorting to its usual propaganda tactics, the PRC blamed 
reactionaries in Tibet and Western imperialists for the disturbances. 
According to the official line, the Tibetan people loved the Chinese 
people and welcomed autonomy under the PRe. The Chinese 
accused the United States, India, and the Republic of China of 
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instigating the riots, claiming that they had abducted the Dalai Lama. 
When the Dalai Lama later issued a statement from India repudiating 
the Communist allegations, and denouncing the PRC for crimes 
including the violation of the Seventeen Point Agreement, Beijing 
could only describe the Dalai Lama's statement as lies. The PRC 
government maintained that the Tibetan question was an "internal" 
problem which was not a concern of outsiders. It expressed this view 
forcefully to the Indian government, denouncing the debate which 
took place in the Indian Parliament.28 
Nevertheless, sympathy for Tibet persisted in India (except in the 
Indian Communist Party) and despite his desire to maintain friendly 
relations with China, Indian Prime Minister Nehru granted the Dalai 
Lama political asylum.29 Unfortunately for Tibet, there was no 
outcry from other nations. 
With the world turning a blind eye to Tibet, the Chinese Commu-
nists began more oppressive measures. On March 28, 1959, Premier 
Zhou Enlai issued an Order of State Council which had the effect of 
dissolving the government of Tibet. The Dalai Lama denounced the 
new Chinese-backed government in Lhasa and maintained that the 
people of Tibet would never recognize it. He established a provision-
al government at Lhuntse Dzong and promised to maintain a 
government in exile at the foothills of the Himalayas in the northeast 
of India. 
During the years since the Chinese moved into Tibet, the Dalai 
Lama has tried to seek a peaceful solution through conciliatory 
measures. His aim has been the achievement of some type of 
autonomy for Tibet. In addition, he has sought to minimize violence 
and to meet difficulties with passive resistance, rather than violence. 
However, the PRC had decided on harsh measures in exercising 
control over Tibet. The Chinese armed forces in Tibet had been 
increased to one hundred and fifty thousand. When resistance had 
broken out in Eastern Tibet, the Chinese brutally suppressed it. The 
Dalai Lama had been threatened with assassination if he did not 
cooperate. When the officials in the Dalai Lama's government 
expressed any degree of resistance toward Chinese policies, they lost 
their positions in the Tibetan government and were sent into exile.3D 
William e. van Walt van Praag, who taught Tibetan studies at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies and served one term as 
the director of the Tibetan Affairs Coordination Office in the 
Netherlands, has applied his expertise in international law to the 
analysis of the Tibetan political situation. In viewing Tibet during 
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this period, he concluded: 
In short, Tibet was under military occupation, and the position 
secured by the Chinese through armed invasion was being 
maintained by the continued use and threat of force... Under 
these conditions the Dalai Lama's conduct and that of his officials 
between 1951 and 1959 certainly cannot be regarded as constitut-
ing free expressions of agreement or consent. Throughout this 
period Tibet was under military occupation and no Tibetan was in 
a position to express any opposition to the Chinese without 
incurring the risk of serious repercussions.3! 
The great explorer and writer Lowell Thomas and his son, Lowell 
Thomas, Jr., visited Tibet. From his knowledge of world affairs and 
his experience in Tibet, Lowell Thomas, Jr. described in vivid and 
dramatic prose the plight of the Tibetans: 
The suffering of the Tibetans had never been so great. The 
Communists now did not try to hide the fact that they meant to 
crush the people once and for all. More troops were airlifted in 
a steady stream. Armed vehicles were brought in. A well-planned 
and co-ordinated attack against the entire resistance movement 
was begun. 
Whole villages had been wiped out. In many others the head men 
were sent to concentration camps and every able-bodied man put 
to forced labor. Many of the monasteries, together with their 
valuable relics and libraries, have been utterly destroyed, the 
monks either killed or scattered. The border has been sealed in 
an attempt to stop all traffic to and from the outside, and all 
radios in Tibet have been confiscated to prevent any semblance of 
the truth from reaching the people. Food supplies have been 
controlled in an effort to starve the Tibetans into submission. 
"The fact that the Tibetans refused to submit offers little basis for 
optimism about their country's future.,,32 
Mao Zedong was indifferent to the cultural and historic treasures 
of Tibet, as his writings and his letters to the Dalai Lama clearly 
showed; he regarded religion as a manifestation of cultural back-
wardness. Tibet was scheduled to be remolded into the new 
Communist society Mao sought to create. Any institution or any 
individual who resisted this new direction was expendable. Mao was 
prepared to conduct genocide against the Tibetan people in order to 
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accomplish his objectives. 
As we have mentioned, the subjugation of Tibet was one of the 
integral elements in Mao's first five-year plan for economic develop-
ment. Mao had secured control on the Chinese mainland and under 
an oppressive regime had began the economic restructuring of China. 
He seized financial control of all private enterprise and "nationalized" 
businesses. Once this was accomplished, Mao began his push for 
industrialization. He worked closely with China's then ally, the Soviet 
Union, in pursuing this objective. If successful, it would require a 
close link to the Soviet economy. Mao also developed a plan for the 
outlying areas of China where the minorities peoples resided, a plan 
which included Tibet. 
The plan promoted the reclamation of vast tracts of undeveloped 
land in outlying areas which would help China make up for its deficit 
in agricultural production as it pursued industrialization. Mao 
consequently moved large numbers of Chinese for resettlement in the 
areas of the northwest, northern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and 
Chinese Turkestan as well as on the island of Hainan. He believed 
that over 250 million acres were then available for agricultural 
development. Since these areas were along or near the border with 
the Soviets, Soviet support was hoped for and expected. The split 
with the Soviets in the 1960s ended economic cooperation with the 
Soviets and Beijing stationed troops in the border regions to protect 
itself from a possible Soviet attack. In Mao's plan, Tibet possessed 
not only great potential for agricultural production, but also for the 
development of key minerals. Tibet and Chinese Turkestan were 
sources for such mineral deposits as uranium and oil. Chairman Mao 
hoped to link these areas with China through railroads and other 
communication links.32 
The Tibetans, while welcoming some modernization, resisted those 
elements of the Chinese plan which threatened their culture, religious 
practices, and livelihood. Through negotiations and passive resistance 
the Tibetan people attempted to modify the sweeping charges 
demanded by the Chinese plan. Yet, the PRC would accept nothing 
less than total submission from the Tibetans and were prepared to 
use brutality to achieve this objective. Sinologist Franz Michael, 
former director of the Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington 
University (Washington, D.C.), vividly describes the tragedy of Tibet 
under the PRC conquest: 
The worst cases of persecution occurred in Tibet, a country 
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invaded in 1950 by the Chinese. In 1959 the Chinese bloodily 
suppressed a rebellion that led to the flight of the Dalai Lama and 
a hundred thousand Tibetans to India, with many more perishing 
on the way. The subsequent Chinese policy instituted in Tibet 
must be regarded as one of the worst cases of genocide of the 
century. Besides exterminating barbarically at least one million of 
an estimated six million Tibetans, the Chinese systemically 
dynamited and destroyed (with the exception of fewer than twenty 
of the most prestigious structures such as the Pot ala in Lhasa) 
more than three thousand Tibetan temples and monasteries, after 
looting them of their treasures. After Mao's death there followed 
a period of relaxation, but the goal of the Communist policy 
remained unchanged. It will remain a dark spot on the Chinese 
name.33 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Transformation of Tibet 
Although we think of confrontations between nations in terms of 
military moves and political declarations, Tibet's struggle against 
China was symbolized by the actions of one individual who, in the 
perceptions of millions of people beyond the borders of China and of 
Tibet, represented the unique socio-political system of Tibet. 
Accordingly, the decision for the Dalai Lama to go into exile was a 
difficult one. As he made his arduous journey toward the Indian 
frontier, without any means of communicating with the outside world, 
his escape made headlines throughout the world. On reaching the 
last major settlement in Tibet, Mangmang, the Dalai Lama received 
word that the Indian government was willing to accept him as an 
exile. 
While preparing to cross the last mountain range into India, the 
weather turned bad, with heavy rain, and the Dalai Lama became ill. 
Despite his illness, he was loaded on the back of a dzo, an animal 
resembling a cross between a cow and a yak. It was on this humble 
form of transportation that the religious and secular leader of Tibet 
avoided capture, imprisonment, and possibly even death at the hands 
of the Chinese Communists. For his journey to India, the Dalai 
Lama was accompanied by a number of the religious and secular 
officials, but his military guards turned back to rejoin the battle for 
Tibet. 1 
Seeking International Support 
Soon after his arrival in India, the Dalai Lama held a press 
conference which repudiated the Seventeen Point Agreement. He 
noted that even though the treaty was signed under duress, it might 
have been regarded as binding (e.g., a treaty signed by a losing side 
in a war is binding even though it is dictated by the victor), but the 
Chinese had clearly violated their own treaty. The Dalai Lama made 
this observation: 
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But if a treaty is violated by one of the parties to it, it can legally be 
repudiated by the other party, and then it is no l~nger in force. 
The Chinese had certainly violated the Seventeen Pomt Agreement, 
and we were willing to prove it. Now I h~d repudiat~d the agree-
ment, it had ceased to bind us, and our claIm to s?vere;gnty was the 
same as it had been before the agreement was sIgned. 
Students of international relations frequently make note ~f the role 
of international law in dealing with disputes between natIOns. The 
record of the international system is filled with reminders of the 
limits of law as an instrument for conflict resolution. The Tibetan 
case is one more indication of the shortcomings of international law. 
Following his repudiation of the Seventeen p~int Agr~ement, the 
Dalai Lama turned to those instruments of the mternatIOnal system 
which might be of assistance to the Tibetans. The existe?ce of .the 
United Nations actually proved to be a stumbling block smce TIbet 
was not a member. For that matter, the PRC was also. ?ot a 
member since the China seat was still held by the leg1tlmate 
govern~ent of the Republic of China on Taiwan. ~he Internation~l 
Commission of Jurists, as mentioned in the prevIous chapter, dId 
undertake an investigation of the situation in Tibet, thoroughly 
examining the records and statements of Tibe~an and Chinese 
officials. It noted Beijing's record of persecutlon, torture, ~nd 
murder, and that the lamas had been special targets of persecutIOn. 
The lamas had been humiliated, whipped, and taunted. Some were 
invited by their Marxist tormentors to perf~~m miracle~ to save 
themselves before being put to death. In addItIon, the Chm~se had 
taken children from their parents, sending many to Chma for 
indoctrination, and in some villages they had sterilized b~th men and 
women.3 In spite of this record of atrocities, there was httle th~t the 
legal institutions of the international community could accomphsh on 
behalf of Tibet. 
A more immediate question regarding Tibet is why the ~hinese 
authorities turned their destructive attentions toward thIS small 
nation. The Dalai Lama offered three explanations for .this actio~. 
First, Tibet's large geographic area and its small pop~latlon mad~ It 
an attractive target to Communist China. Its rapIdly expandm~ 
population was beginning to move into Tibet in s~ch ~u~bers ~hat It 
seemed the Tibetans would eventually become a mmonty m theIr own 
country. As a result, the Maoists had brought to Tib~t somethin.g it 
had never experienced in its long history: regular penods of famme. 
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Second, Tibet's rich mineral wealth attracted Beijing as a means of 
enriching China. Finally, because of Tibet's strategic position, Tibet 
could support the ultimate objective of the PRC's foreign policy -
domination of Asia. As the Dalai Lama later observed: 
With modern weapons, its mountains can be made an almost 
impregnable citadel from which to launch attacks on India, Burma, 
Pakistan, and the southeast Asian states, in order to dominate these 
countries, destroy their religions as ours is being destroyed, and 
spread the doctrine of atheism further. The Chinese are reported 
already to have built eighteen airfields in Tibet and a network of 
military roads through the country. Since they know perfectly well 
that India has no intention of attacking them, the only possible use 
for these military preparations is as a base for future expansion.4 
While neither the PRC nor Tibet was a member of the United 
Nations, two members of the United Nations, Ireland and Malaya, 
introduced a resolution on behalf of Tibet which was adopted on 
October 21, 1959. The vote was forty-five in favor, nine against, with 
twenty-six nations abstaining. United Nations resolutions, of course, 
have no binding legal effect so the Beijing government chose to 
simply ignore it. 5 
The PRC Continues Persecution of Tibet 
The Chinese Communists, ignoring the United Nations' resolutions 
and the two reports of the International Commission of Jurists, 
continued their policy of subjugating Tibet. They felt even more 
confident of the success of their plans now that the Dalai Lama was 
no longer in Tibet to lead resistance to their designs. Now that the 
open military conquest of Tibet had been completed, the instruments 
of low intensity conflict were applied to the struggle in this remote 
region. 
An especially important facet of low intensity conflict in Tibet was 
the effort by Chinese authorities to destroy Tibet's institutionalized 
belief system. In their effort to destroy Buddhism, the Chinese 
attempted to use elements of the religious community in developing 
propaganda themes. Forced by circumstances to recognize that 
Buddhism played such a fundamental role in Tibetan life, the Chinese 
decided to make indirect and temporary concessions to religion. 
Accordingly, they attempted to use a distorted form of Buddhism as 
a means to further subjugate the Tibetans. The theme adopted by 
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the Communists was that the conquest of Tibet by the PRC would 
improve Buddhism by reforming it. 
During the Sixth World Conference on Buddhis~ in 1961, the 
leader of the Chinese delegation, Shirob J altso, dehvered a spe~ch 
which focused on Tibetan Buddhism. Shirob J altso's speech ~etalled 
an official campaign to create an "approved" variant of Buddhism .. By 
denouncing the Tibetan upper class as a "reactionary group" Whl.ch 
was attempting to start a rebellion, he .credited the PRC with 
cleansing the monasteries of "the brand of mfamy left b~ the slave~ 
system of the past" and, thereby, of aiding the monastenes t.o regam 
"their original purity and magnificence."6 In his view, an enhghtened 
Buddhist was a person who would accept Chinese leadership because 
it was a "progressive" social and political force. 
This Chinese Communist spokesman blamed the rebels for ~he 
destruction of the monasteries and portrayed the PRC as a dutIful 
"mother" which had helped rescue the lamas, wipe out reactionary 
influences on Buddhism, and end the feudalism and serfdom 
perpetuated by the system. The pure doct.rin~ of ~uddha had been 
restored by these Chinese reforms, he mam~amed. . 
During his address, Shirob J altso d~scnbed how the <?hmese 
Buddhist Academy, which had opened m ~956, ~a? estabhs~l~d a 
special Tibetan department intended to provide trammg for rehgious 
service. Thus, the argument advanced the idea that the reform ?f 
Buddhism was an outgrowth of the Chinese invasion. Buddhist 
nations in particular were targeted for this p~opaganda theme.s In 
this fashion, authorities were not only developmg a theme that would 
advance local Chinese interests in Tibet, but would also serve the 
cause of China's foreign policy. In short, once again domestic and 
international policies were mutually reinfor~ing. . 
The Chinese communists tried to use tillS mampulated form of 
Buddhism to advance their cause, just as they had earlier distorted 
Confucianism as a means of advancing their political interests on the 
Chinese mainland. The Chinese became adept not only in denounc-
ing Buddhism and Confucianism as reaction~ry doc~rines, but also in 
distorting the teachings of these two great phllOSo~hleS to make ~hem 
appear to be in harmony with Chinese Commumst party doctnne. 
An important feature of a balance of power system is that: in the 
name of self-interest, many nations will sacrifice what might be 
regarded as "principle" in order to advance a larger na.ti~nal pur~ose. 
The Dalai Lama felt the disappointing impact of thiS mternatIonal 
tendency as Buddhist countries did little or nothing in response to the 
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destruction of Tibet by the Chinese. Professor Kochi Nomoto wrote 
in a Buddhist publication (The Young East, Winter, 1959) that the low 
level of Japanese reaction was due to inadequate information. This 
is hardly a credible explanation. For example, the Japanese Buddhist 
Federation meeting in 1959 took note of the Tibetan situation but 
merely sent a resolution of sympathy to the Dalai Lama through 
Indian Prime Minister Nehru. Also, a few small protest meetings 
were held at which the participants demanded that the Chinese stop 
the destruction of Buddhist monuments and institutions in Tibet. 
Conferences on Tibet were organized by the Buddhist Peace 
Conference of the Council for Sino-Japanese Buddhist Cultural 
Exchange and the Study Group for Modern Buddhism. Apart from 
resolutions expressing sympathy for the plight of the Tibetans and 
Tibetan Buddhism, there was little political follow-through which 
could aid the Tibetans.9 While the Japanese may well have been 
shocked by the Chinese actions in Tibet, once again, national interests 
in a balance of power context made a forceful reaction against the 
Chinese unlikely. 
It is generally recognized that geographic proximity is an important 
factor in the likelihood that a nation will be involved in war. The 
geographic proximity of many Buddhist countries to a powerful China 
is undoubtedly another important factor mitigating against a more 
decisive reaction against the Chinese. It may have been that Buddhist 
countries bordering on China feared arousing the hostility of their 
Maoist neighbors. As a result, even at official Buddhist conferences 
little was done to aid Tibet. lO ' 
The Cultural Revolution Comes to Tibet 
The Chinese Communists used their worldwide propaganda 
apparatus to suppress charges of persecution in Tibet by claiming that 
a great new day had dawned in Tibet. Their regime, they maintained, 
had "liberated" Tibet and brought a new prosperity to this once 
backward region. The Chinese party line on Tibet was linked closely 
to the Maoist personality cult. A publication entitled "Great Changes 
in Tibet", published in 1972, is representative of this view. The tone 
is set in a passage by Pasang, who is described as Vice-Chairman of 
the Revolutionary Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region. 
Pasang describes his birth and the changes which came to his 
homeland: 
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I was born in a slave's family in Konka Cou~ty, Tibet. U~der 
t. ry feudal serfdom I was a slave for mne years and lived reac IOna ' C· t P rty like a beast of burden. Chairman Mao and the omm~ms a. t 
saved me from slavery and nurtured me to become a o~~ums 
d a res onsible cadre. My mother gave birth to me, but It IS t.he ~:rty whkh saved me and invincible Mao Tsetung ~ought ~hlCh 
sustains me. I want to cheer again and again: 'Long Live ChaIrman 
Mao' A long long life to him!' . 
o t b 1 of 1966 is the most unforgettable day of m~ life. As a 
coer .ve of the minority nationalities, I met Chatrman Mao, 
representa1tl d f the people of all China's nationalities, on the 
the great ea er a lb· II 
. M t at the Peking National Day ce e ratIOn ra y. Twn An en ros rum . M 
As I ha il shook hands with the great teacher Chatrman ao, ~y 
h 
pp Yd d There were so many things I wanted to say. WIth 
eart poun e . ·11·· t 
. I . d· 'Chairman Mao, we the ml Ion emanclpa -teedarTsl.~e~~ ~~~~ a~:l determined always to follow you in making 
I ff , ,11 revolution. We wish you a long, ong 1 e .. 
The am hlet is filled with similar claims as to how M.ao and the 
. p PIt· had brought change and progress to Tlbet. These Chmese revo u Ion . 1· £ Tb t 
es were attributed not only to the Commumst po ICY or 1 e ~angthe 1950s but to the abolition of the original Tibeta.n govern-
m~~t with the departure of the Dalai Lama ("the Dem?cratIc ~eform 
. 1959") and the Great Proletarian Cultural RevolutIon. Hsm M~~ ~~unched an attack on the Dalai Lama, stating tha~, unde~ th~ Da :1 
Lama, Lhasa was not a real paradise but only a. paradIse "or t e 
bloodsuckers and a hell on earth for the ":orkmg,, people. He 
d. d how "Tibet was peacefully liberated m 1951 an.d how: ~s a r~~~:s~f the Chinese occupation, it had "witnesse~ rapId pOh.tIcal, 
. and cultural advances" under the leadershIp of the Chmese 
economIC, . Ch· ·nst 
C ·st Party Drawing on the current battles m ma agal ommum . " h d tl lot" Lui Shao-chi (Liu Shaoqi), he noted that Mao had smas e Ie p 
to restore serfdom which Liu Shao-chi and his group ~ad sought to 
institute. Great advances were claimed on the. An P~ateau f~r 
a ricultural and shepherds, and the creation of an. mdustnal base m ~. 1· d Hung Nung hailing the agncultural advances, Lmclllh was acc alme . ' bI" d 
declared that the "Tibetan peasants and herdsmen are redou mg an 
. d· ,,12 promotmg pro uctlOn. . h 
The Chinese attempted to use such propaganda teachmgs a~ t ese 
to obscure the truth about what was happening in Tibet f~llowmg th~ 
D 1 . Lama's departure and the initiation of the Proletanan Cultura R:v~lution in the PRe. Mao launched this revolutionary struggle as 
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an effort to maintain the Chinese Communist Party's control and to 
involve the young generation in a revolutionary experience. The 
result was chaos and disruption throughout China. Students attacked 
teachers, children attacked parents, leading scholars were humiliated, 
Communist officials were purged, and thousands of Red Guards were 
unleashed on the country to destroy homes, businesses, and cultural 
properties. The Red Guards, motivated by Mao's declarations of 
revolutionary fervor, challenged all authority including that of the 
military, the county and local governments, and even the Communist 
Party itself. 
Tibet would suffer additional horrors during this period of 
disruption between the factions of the left and the right of the 
Chinese Communist movement. The Cultural Revolution directly 
affected Tibet from 1966 until 1969 but its aftermath was felt until 
Mao's death in 1976. This decade of destruction had an enormous 
impact on the Tibetan nation. In addition to the loss of historical 
treasures, the most critical aspect of the Cultural Revolution was a 
renewed effort to establish socialist communes, something the 
Tibetans had successfully avoided until then.13 
The attempt to impose communes on the Tibetans had started as 
early as 1962. The Tibetans had resisted the communes because they 
viewed them not only as a vehicle to deprive them of ownership of 
the land, their tools, and all other instruments of production, but also 
as a form of mass imprisonment. With the advent of this new policy, 
people were forced to sign documents "requesting" the communes and 
to relinquish all their possessions. A compensation rate was set, far 
below the actual value of the property, and the Tibetans were to 
receive this compensation over a three to five-year period. In fact, 
they never received any of the promised compensations as the 
Chinese Communist officials later determined that they could be 
compensated only when the communes started making a profit. Each 
commune consisted of one hundred to two hundred families, roughly 
about one thousand people. Conditions were harsh. The Tibetans 
were required to work from early morning until late evening; the 
rules were so brutally enforced that the corpses of those who died 
while on work details were not buried for days. Children as young as 
six or seven and people in their eighties were forced to work in the 
communes. People experienced reduced rations as well as new taxes. 
The sole result of the communes was to bring famine to Tibet once 
again.14 The best estimates have determined that tens of thousands 
of Tibetans died during the famine of 1968-1973. This brought the 
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final toll of Tibetans who had died as a result of the Communist 
conquest of their nation to one million or one-seventh of the entire 
population.1s 
The Proletarian Cultural Revolution also brought new attacks on 
the religion and culture of Tibet as the Red Guards attempted to 
seize power from the Tibetan Chin~s~ Communist Pa:ty Ce~tral 
Committee. On December 22, 1966 It Issued a declaration statIng: 
We will rebel against the handful of persons in authority in the 
Party taking the capitalist road. W.e will ~ebel a~ain,st perso~s 
stubbornly persisting in the bourgeOls reactlon.ary hne. ~ e wlll 
rebel against all the monsters and freaks! We Will reb.el agamst the 
bourgeois Royalists! We, a group of lawless revolutIOnary rebels, 
will wield the iron sweepers and swing the mighty cudgels to sweep 
the old world into a mess and bash people into complete confusion 
.. , To rebel, to rebel and to rebel through to the end in order to 
f h I . t 16 create a brightly red new world 0 t e pro etana . 
Mao's Cultural Revolution embraced all of China, even its outlying 
regions. The areas occupied by minorities, like the Tibetans, proved 
the most vulnerable. These were the centers of reaction, according 
to the Communists, and the places most in need of revolutionary 
change. Many of the Chinese officials in these regions wer~ targeted 
for failure to reform the "decadent" societies under their control. 
When the Cultural Revolution officially came to Tibet on August 25, 
1966 the Red Guards invaded Tibet's leading monastery, destroying 
or defacing ancient frescoes and images. Irreplaceable historic 
manuscripts were burned; many sacred monasteries were converted 
into barns for pigs and other farm animals, and Mao's picture was 
prominently displayed throughout the city of LhasaY . 
The Red Guards took special delight in ridiculing, defaCIng, or 
destroying every aspect of Tibetan culture, especiall~ the religious 
features of Tibet. Religious pictures on walls were paInted over; the 
sacred prayer flags were ripped down and replaced by the Communist 
red banner. Even under the "democratic reforms" of 1959 there had 
been a strict adherence to discipline; now the Tibetans had even more 
to fear as the Cultural Revolution degenerated into mob violence. 
Some Tibetans committed suicide rather than face torture at the 
hands of Communist gangs; violence was perpetrated against 
moderate Chinese Communists as well as against the Tibetans. In his 
perceptive study of the Tibetans, John Avedon noted that the Red 
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Guard faction "vied for preeminence in the work of demolishing every 
vestige of Tibetan culture". He wrote that had it not been for the 
refugees who fled to India, even the memory of Tibetan culture might 
have been erased: 
Everything Tibetan was destroyed; everything Chinese and Commu-
nist adopted. The practice of religion was officially outlawed. Folk 
festivals and fairs were banned, traditional dances and songs, 
incense burning and all Tibetan art forms and customs prohibited 
... Allover Tibet people with "bad" class designations, who had not 
as yet been imprisoned, were dragged into the street and paraded 
in paper dunce caps - beaten and spat upon as they passed, tags 
listing their "crimes" pinned to their naked chest - in processions 
led by Red Guards beating drums, cymbals, and gongs.1S 
The lamas, who sought only peace and contentment in accordance 
with their Buddhist religion, had heavy religious statues lashed to 
their backs while merchants and members of the former nobility were 
forced to carry heavy vessels, the kind normally used to store grain, 
on their backs as they were marched through the streets. But the 
Cultural Revolution fell most heavily on the monasteries. Massive 
destruction began, as frescoes were destroyed, manuscripts burned, 
and buildings destroyed. While gold, silver, and other precious 
metals were stolen, a Tibetan Revolutionary Museum was established 
in the village of Shol, just below the Potala, and became a mandatory 
stop for all visiting delegations who came to Tibet. As a propaganda 
supplement to these brutal attacks, radio broadcasts portrayed the 
Dalai Lama as a political corpse, a bandit, and a traitor!9 
In spite of these actions, there was an endurance of the national 
idea among this region's embattled population. The Tibetan spirit 
was not crushed by the atrocities of this era and by 1969 there were 
indications that another Tibetan rebellion, much like the one in 1959 
which led to the Dalai Lama's departure, had been launched against 
Chinese domination. The 1969 revolt, coming on the heels of the 
Cultural Revolution, expanded from a struggle against the commune 
system into a call for independence from Chinese Communist control. 
In one incident, over one thousand people attacked local Communist 
officials and, after suffering defeat, fled into the hills. These rebels 
were eventually captured by the Chinese troops who subjected them 
to a public execution along with their leader, a Buddhist nun. 
Approximately twenty county units participated in the 1969 rebellion, 
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but the Chinese authorities brutally suppressed resistance in every 
region, holding public trials and sentencing many of the participants 
to death.20 It is possible that the 1969 uprising may have resulted 
in as many deaths as the more widely publicized 1959 rebellion. 
The end of the Cultural Revolution and the deaths of Zhou Enlai 
and Mao Zedong in 1976 brought a glimmer of relief and the hope 
that the fanaticism which had afflicted Tibet might now be ended. 
The end of the extreme policies of this era saw a relaxation of 
revolutionary rhetoric and a renewed tendency to accept at least some 
of the distinctive features of China's minority populations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Tibet in the Post-Maoist Era 
Following the death of Mao Zedong, Tibetans might have hoped 
that there would be a period of relaxation with the initiation of new 
Chinese Communist Party leadership dominated by Deng Xiaoping. 
Undoubtedly, conditions in this era were better than they were during 
the Cultural Revolution, but their long-term prospects are only 
marginally better. Some political controls were relaxed, and, as will 
be explained in the next chapter, efforts were made to strengthen the 
Tibetan economy. In a small concession to religion, some of the 
monasteries destroyed during the Cultural Revolution were rebuilt, 
even though the historic treasures that were destroyed cannot be 
recovered. But the Dalai Lama remained in exile, and there was no 
evidence that the PRC had abandoned its goal of destroying Tibetan 
culture and religion and turning Tibet into an area for Chinese 
colonization. It is obvious that in Mainland China, Deng Xiaoping's 
methods may be more restrained than those of Mao Zedong, but it 
is only a change in strategy and not in objectives. It is only a respite 
in the PRC's normal pattern of behavior as Beijing seeks massive 
development through the "Four Modernizations" program. However, 
if any doubt existed about the ultimate program or objectives of the 
Deng Xiaoping regime so far as Tibet is concerned, this doubt was 
expelled by examining the conditions which led the Tibetans to a 
another revolt in 1987, and the brutal suppression of this revolt in 
1987 and 1988. 
As we examine this stage in the development of the Tibetan 
situation, it is necessary to imagine a map of Tibet in which one sees 
the "Tibet Autonomous Region" situated in the heart of Asia, located 
on a high plateau between China and the Indian subcontinent and 
covering an area over 500,000 square miles. Approximately six 
million Tibetans live within this region and another 115,000 Tibetans 
live in exile in places such as Nepal and India. The map, therefore, 
does not give one a complete picture because it obscures the 
territorial adjustments that Chinese authorities made in an effort to 
dilute the Tibetan population. 
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Fully one half of the area of Tibet is actually u~de.r sep~r~te 
Chinese provincial administration as a result of a terntonal dlvlslon 
made by the Chinese Communists in 1951. For example, most of 
Amdo, the northeast province of Tibet (which includes the region 
known as Kokonor), has been renamed Quinghai, and is thus 
administered as a separate province of China, while a small area of 
Amdo has been annexed by another Chinese province, Gansu. 
Kham, an eastern province of Tibet, has been annexed by the nearby 
Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Gansu, as well as by the 
province of Qinghai. The Tibetan areas within these ~hi~ese 
provinces are administered as "autonomous" prefectures and dlstncts. 
These regions contain four million Tibetans. The "Tibetan Autono-
mous Region" (TAR) is located to the southwest of this area and 
actually comprises slightly more than half the original Tibetan nation 
and contains the most important cities: Lhasa (the capital), Shigatse, 
Guantse, and Chamdo.1 Journalist Laura Pilarski has observed that 
Tibet's "lost territories" contain some of the most valuable human 
resources of the original Tibetan nation.2 
Aside from the geographical partition of Tibet, two major crises 
face this nation: (1) tb.e. Chinese milita!), forces which brutall¥ 
suppress any hopes for Tibetan independence: and (2) the Chinese 
policfC[i0pulation transfer which threatens the Tibetans with 
becoming a minority in their ow -- \ 
To un erstand PRC policy, reference must be made to Mao 
Zedong's view of Tibet, and its importance as an economic and 
political center. It was first seen by Beijing as an area for economic 
development with the aid of the Soviets, but after the split between 
the two Communist powers, it was perceived as a buffer zone for 
protecting China from a Soviet attack and as a base from which 
Chinese nuclear weapons might command the very center of the 
Soviet Asian empire. Mao sought to accomplish this development by 
a dramatic increase in Tibet's population. He planned a five-fold 
population increase by means of a massive movement of Chinese into 
Tibet. The national uprising in 1959 led to a further decline in the 
Tibetan population, as many Tibetans died and tens of thousands 
were imprisoned or sent to labor camps. The Tibetan government-in-
exile has estimated that over one-sixth of the population, or 1,200,000 
Tibetans, has died as a direct result of the PRC invasion of Tibet. 
Despite a change in style, Deng Xiaoping's Tibetan policy differs little 
from Mao's policy on population resettlement. 
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The Chinese statistics for the years 1979 and 1980 revealed that 
a total of 130,000 Chinese cadres who were government employees 
remained in the Tibet Autonomous Region, supported by Chinese 
troops numbering anywhere between 150,000 to 600,000. The 
announcement, in 1980, that Chinese cadres would be withdrawn 
within three years was never fulfilled. In fact from 1984 there was an 
increased influx of Chinese residents. Recent statistics indicate that 
Beijing has sent about 6.2 million civilians into Tibet, while maintain-
ing about half a million troops in the country. Despite denials by 
PRC officials, the evidence remains strong that a deliberate policy is 
being followed to overwhelm the Tibetans in their own country. 
Statistics which have been gathered show that: 
The Tibetan population is about 6 million and the estimated 6.2 
milli~ Chinese civilians ~n Tibet (with up to half a millIon tr~ops) 
demonstrate that the Chmese already oUQ1Umber the Tibetans on 
the Tlb~tan plateau. 
Amdo Province: the Chinese outnumber the Tibetans in Amdo 
Province (now known as Qinghai) three to one. Previous to 1950, 
few Chinese settlers lived there. (Current population: 800,000 
Tibetans; 2.5 million Chinese). 
Kham Province: the Tibetans are still in a small majority here, 
with 2 to 3 million Tibetans in the province to about 2 million 
Chinese. However, the close location to one of the most populous 
Chinese provinces, Sichuan, makes this area one of the most 
vulnerable for Tibetans. 
The Tibetan Autonomous Region has the lowest concentration of 
Chinese (1.7 million), but it is this area in which Chinese settlers 
are now being encouraged to move as new communities are 
established for the Chinese, and Tibetans are to move into the 
more arid and less developed parts of Tibet. 
The two largest cities in Tibet, Lhasa at 200,000 and Shigatse at 
50,000, have taken on a Chinese appearance, with neighborhood 
buildings resembling Beijing architecture more than traditional 
Tibetan architecture. 
Other cultural discrimination is obvious, with schools providing 
better instruction to the Chinese. The Chinese language is used 
on radio programs, and Chinese publications stress the need for 
both skilled and unskilled labor to move to Tibet. Chinese who 
remain in Tibet after retirement receive larger pensions. 
Tibetan unemployment is increasing as the distinct Tibetan culture 
and economy is supplemented by the new settlers with the 
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different culture.3 
After a thorough study of this situation, legal scholar and Tibetan 
expert, Michael C. van Walt van Praag, has concluded: 
The real fear exists that if the present Chinese policy is successful 
_ and indications are that it is - Tibetans will be reduced to a 
small and insignificant minority in their own country in the s~me 
way as the Manchurians, the Turkic peoples and the ~o.ngohans 
have been. Early this century, the Manchus were a dIstmct race 
with their own culture and traditions. Today only 2 to 3 million 
Manchurians are left in Manchuria, where 75 million Chinese 
have settled. In Eastern Turkestan, which the Chinese now call 
Xinjiang, the Chinese population has grown fron: 200,000 in.1?49 
to 7 million more than half of the total populatIOn of 13 mIllion. 
In the wake of the Chinese colonization of Inner Mongolia, 
Chinese now outnumber the Mongols by 8.5 million to 2 million 
in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. The 4 million Hui, 
or so-called Chinese Muslims of the Ninxia Hui Autonomous 
Region, have been entirely encompassed by Chinese settlers.4 
John Avedon, a widely recognized specialist on Tibet, has termed 
this Chinese policy of mass movement of population into Tibet as 
"Chinese apartheid," although in the case of Tibet the immigrant 
labor controls the government, whereas in South Africa the immi-
grant labor does not control the government. He notes the develop-
ing crisis in Tibet: Tibetans face gr~wing unemployment and ~n 
annual inflation rate 0000 percent WhICh has reduced the per capIta 
income to just $110 annually. Faced with this meager inc.ome, the 
average Tibetan still lives in an antiquated house lackm~ heat, 
running water, and electricity. Seventy percent of the. populatl~n ~re 
considered illiterate with only one of every five chIldren fimshmg 
primary school. The average life span is forty years with infant 
mortality at the rate of one in six.5 
The poor condition of the average Tibetan is in sharp contrast to 
the PRC immigrants who benefit from the system. Those settlers 
who are dispatched to this region as a matter of Beijing's. policy 
receive at least a third more in income than the average TIbetan. 
These immigrants receive guaranteed jobs as well as modern housing 
and enjoy generous support to meet their medical and nutritional 
needs. Although schooling is limited, two-thirds of the seats in school 
are reserved for the immigrants. The Chinese outnumber the 
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Tibetans, 7.5 million to 6 million. Although Deng Xiaoping has 
claimed that the Chinese immigrants are only there to help build 
Tibet and that they will eventually leave, the great building boom in 
Tibet and the pension bonuses for those who settle there are a strong 
indication that they will likely stay. More recently, as is discussed in 
the next chapter, there is an expansion of benefits that includes 
special tax breaks. Avedon points out that this pattern is part of a 
deliberate Chinese Communist policy with an obvious purpose: 
The Sinocization of Tibet is no more accidental than its military 
occupation. Given the region's chronic unrest, typified by ongoing 
executions of political dissidents, the internment of almost 4,000 
political prisoners in the capital city of Lhasa, and the presence of 
one Chinese soldier for every ten Tibetans in central Tibet alone. 
Sinocization is the requisite corollary to open force: a subtle but 
effective means to submerge the identity of Beijing's most 
intransigent subject race.6 
American television journalist Tom Brokaw, visiting Tibet for a 
television special, also observed the presence of Chinese everywhere. 
Most of the workers in hotels and manufacturing plants are Chinese 
and the signs in the cities are in both the Tibetan and Chinese 
languages.7 
In its long history Tibet has had numerous conflicts with its 
neighbor, China, and, as mentioned previously, has previously been 
invaded by China. However, in the case of these earlier invasions the 
purpose of the Chinese government was only to gain political control 
and not to destroy the Tibetan people, their culture, or their religion. 
The invasion by the People's Republic of China has been of a 
different nature - seeking not only total political power but the 
gradual destruction of all that was unique to Tibet in a forceful and 
brutal manner. The suppression of religious freedom, the continuing 
military occupation, the outlawing of any signs of Tibetan national-
ism, and the constant flow of Chinese settlers into Tibet is something 
never experienced by Tibet in its entire history. The combination of 
these acts threatens the very existence of the Tibetan people and 
culture. 
The 1987 Crisis 
As the oppression ofthe PRC Communists continued, even under 
Deng Xiaoping, new disturbances occurred late in 1987 and early in 
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1988. The significance of the events of this period can be best 
appreciated by viewing the circumstances which led to the protests. 
As the agenda of the international community began to include 
matters which had previously been ignored, the Tibetan crisis became 
a focus of international concern. 
In the United States, there was a growing concern over human 
rights conditions in China. This concern eventually prompted the 
United States House of Representatives to pass a resolution criticiz-
ing the People's Republic of China for human rights violations in 
Tibet and for its military occupation of the country. Passage of the 
resolution increased both official as well as popular interest in Tibet's 
plight. 
In response to this interest, the Dalai Lama scheduled a trip to the 
United States. Concerned about the possible implications of this 
visit, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China sent a message 
to the U.S. State Department urging that U.S. officials prevent the 
Dalai Lama from making any political statement during his visit. 
Upon his arrival in Washington, D.C. in September, 1987, the Dalai 
Lama outlined a five-point peace plan for Tibet in an address to the 
U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus on Capitol Hill, an event 
which was widely covered in the U.S. news media. On September 22, 
the U.S. Congress passed a resolution which praised the Dalai Lama 
as a spiritual leader of Buddhism and as a world leader advancing the 
cause of peace. A letter was sent to PRC officials by Members of 
Congress endorsing the Dalai Lama's peace plan. 
For the Tibetans, foreign policy had an immediate domestic 
impact. Chinese officials in Beijing decided that it was time to assert 
additional power over the Tibetans. On September 24, just two days 
after passage of the Congressional resolution praising the Dalai 
Lama, Chinese troops in Tibet forced almost 15,000 Tibetans to listen 
to a denunciation of the Dalai Lama's visit to the United States. As 
an especially dramatic warning to dissidents, a Tibetan nationalist, 
Kelsang Tashi, was publicly executed, two others were sentenced to 
death, and eight more imprisoned.s 
Three days later, twenty-one Tibetan monks, joined by five 
laymen, conducted a peaceful demonstration at the most sacred 
shrine of Tibetan Buddhism, the Jokhang Temple. They carried 
Tibetan flags, forbidden by Chinese Communist law, and demanded 
independence for Tibet. The Chinese arrested these demonstrators 
and accused them of committing "counterrevolutionary acts," a charge 
punishable by death.9 The PRC then launched an attack on the U.S. 
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government for its refusal to silence the Dalai Lama during his visit 
in the U .S.IO 
The first week of October provided a shock to the Beijing 
authorities - and revealed the brutality of the PRC government. The 
date October 1st has special significance for the Chinese Communists 
because it was on that day in 1949 that Mao Zedong solidified his 
control over the Chinese mainland and proclaimed the establishment 
of the People's Republic of China. On that same day in Lhasa, 
thousands of Tibetans demonstrated for independence. The PRC 
troops opened fire, killing a seven-year-old child and injuring over 
one hundred people. The Communist forces even arrested various 
foreigners in Lhasa, and on October 5, the official PRC newspaper 
in Tibet, the Tibet Daily, threatened "severe punishment" for those 
who participated in the October 1st demonstrations and failed to 
surrender by October 15.11 On the 6th of October, the Chinese 
attacked 100 monks from the Drepung Monastery while they were 
marching to Lhasa and arrested several monks suspected of support-
ing the resistance movement. 12 
As the Chinese flew reinforcements to Tibet, the three leading 
monasteries in Tibet appealed to the United Nations to help end 
Chinese rule in their country.13 Once again, however, great power 
status prevailed over the international community's concern with 
human rights conditions and the only response to the Tibetan appeal 
was rhetoric. 
As part of the crackdown, the Chinese ordered foreigners out of 
Tibet and prohibited entry by foreigners into Tibet. This action was 
in strong contrast to their recent efforts over to promote tourism in 
the area. Telephone and telex links between Tibet and the outside 
world were severed. Officials told travelers that tickets to Lhasa 
would not be available for ten days and also stopped issuing visas in 
Nepal. Consequently, every major point of entry for Tibet was sealed 
off in order to prevent the world outside from gaining knowledge of 
what was happening.14 
The Dalai Lama issued a statement referring to the brutality which 
now once again affected his homeland: 
I am deeply shocked and grieved by the loss of lives and the 
persons injured during the recent demonstrations in Tibet by the 
Tibetan people against the Chinese rule. I still believe violence 
is not a solution to any problem. I appeal to all human rights 
groups and supporters of freedom and justice to prevail upon the 
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Chinese Government to stop the execution of innocent Tibetans 
and release those imprisoned. 15 
Testimony to the Tibetan Suppression 
The Tibetan people were fortunate that the initial acts of Chinese 
oppression occurred in full view of visiting foreigners who were able 
to bring the story of the persecution of the Tibetans to the outside 
world. Interestingly enough, some of the reports noted that at least 
three foreigners who were sympathetic to the Tibetans had thrown 
stones at the Chinese police as the latter acted to suppress forcefully 
the Tibetan demonstrators. Some of the foreigners even filmed the 
protests and the police action. Monks protected the foreigners and 
helped them evade the police.16 
Charlene L. Fu was one of the first Western reporters to reach 
Lhasa after the October 1 demonstration and spent a week in the 
area until she and thirteen other journalists were expelled. She 
reported seeing truckloads of police, armed with machine guns, 
circling the Tibetan capital and helmeted police equipped with 
machine guns patrolling the main roads of the city. She reported that 
communication was cut off with the Lhasa Hotel, the major Western 
hotel in the Tibetan capital, and announcements ordering foreigners 
to leave were posted around the city. She described an interview with 
one of the young monks at J okhang Temple, where more than twenty 
plainclothes police stood guard ready to suppress any further 
demonstrations. More than 100 monks were arrested but she was 
able to interview one monk who expressed the hope that Communist 
rule in Tibet would end and that Tibetans hoped other countries 
would support Tibet's claim to freedomY 
A letter signed by Robbie Barnett on behalf of a "a Committee of 
45 Westerners in Lhasa" described the events between September 27 
and October 1st. It reported armed police trying to break up the 
demonstrations by Tibetans and the arrival of reinforcements who 
fired into the crowd to clear a pathway between a school and the 
police station. These shots were fired near the south side and to the 
front of the Jokhang temple. The police continued shooting into the 
square from the roofs of buildings. Tibetans and foreigners were 
seized, taken into a school building, although the foreigners were 
released after their film was confiscated. The police station was set 
afire. This letter also described how the Westerners decided to act 
as witness to the event and how they attempted to treat the wounded 
with the limited medical supplies they had available. They summed 
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up their report by noting that: 
We have been asked to treat one woman with severely burnt arms, 
one woman bullet in breast, and one man bullet in chest, but 
contacts have failed to keep rendezvous, due to police activity we 
assume. We arranged more for tomorrow. We have first-hand 
accounts of four other monks shot (left leg, right leg, left hip, 
right shoulder) and three other monks shot dead. So confirmed 
total is six and seriously wounded 13. Local people say 12 dead, 
plus one Chinese policeman killed, and many wounded, including 
children. No Tibetan had guns at any time that we saw.18 
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Two Americans, Dr. William Blake Kerr, a medical director, and 
John Ackerley, a lawyer, told the press in New Delhi, India, that they 
had witnessed the riots but did not participate in them. Dr. Kerr and 
Ackerley were arrested September 28 for possessing a Tibetan 
national flag. The two were held for questioning before being 
ordered to leave Tibet within ten days. Dr. Kerr treated the wounded 
as part of his ethical duty and reported that he saw six Tibetans die 
and treated fourteen others for wounds. Kerr noted that the Tibetans 
were treated as second-class citizens and that religious freedom does 
not exist in Tibet. 19 
Other reports during this dramatic event described the Communist 
crackdown. Tourists described strict security between the city of 
Lhasa and the airport, cancellation of local bus service, and a 10 p.m. 
curfew. The police seemed everywhere. The PRC controlled media 
stressed how much the Chinese were doing to create a prosperous 
Tibet and directed criticism against the Dalai Lama, but noted that: 
Tourists returning to Kathmandu said the Lhasa streets are 
swarming with armed soldiers and plainclothesman. Some of the 
plainclothesmen were also openly carrying automatic weapons. 
The Sera, Drepung, and Ganden monasteries are still sealed. All 
buses coming to Lhasa are being checked thoroughly. Between 
Shigatse and Lhasa alone, a distance of 200 kms, there are seven 
roadblocks where the police check everyone's identity card.20 
U.s. Focus on the Tibetan Situation 
The protests in Tibet took place while the Dalai Lama was visiting 
the United States and attracted great attention in Washington, D.C. 
A special Congressional hearing was held on the human rights 
situation in Tibet and some Members of Congress participated in a 
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press conference on the issue. The Dalai Lama met with the Human 
Rights Caucus on September 21, 1987. The group is a bipartisan 
legislative service organization of the U.S. House of Representatives 
which was established in early 1983 to focus on human rights abuses 
throughout the world and to encourage Congressional action in the 
observance of human rights. At the time of the meeting, it was 
headed by Democrat U.S. Representative Tom Lantos of California 
and Republican U.S. Representative John Porter of Illinois. A 
statement released by the Human Rights Caucus noted that as many 
as one million Tibetans have died as a result of political instability, 
imprisonment, and widescale famine. This document also noted that 
over 6,000 monasteries have been destroyed, and that much of the art 
and literature of Tibet has been destroyed, lost or removed from 
Tibet.21 
U.S. Representative Gus Yatron CD-Pennsylvania) stated that 
despite claims of improvement in the human rights situation of Tibet, 
organizations such as Amnesty International and reports by Tibetan 
exiles have indicated that existing conditions in the area are still 
"deplorable," with a continuation of "disappearances, torture, and 
executions."22 
Representative Lantos appeared at a demonstration in support of 
the people of Tibet on the steps of the U.S. Capitol with the Senate 
Foreign Relations Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) and 
U.S. Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-New York). The PRC, 
rejecting concerns about human rights issues, insisted that such 
criticism was simply a continuation of efforts to interfere with the 
internal affairs in Tibet.23 
Both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate 
passed amendments to the State Department Authorization bill 
condemning Chinese human rights violations. The House passed a 
measure in June of 1987 and the Senate in November of 1987. 
Agreement on similar wording by both branches came on December 
1st when adopted and President Ronald Reagan signed it on 
December 22, 1987. The bill condemned the human rights abuses but 
also called for the support of the Dalai Lama's five-point peace plan 
including the release of political prisoners, tying sales of arms to 
China to respect for human rights in Tibet, and granting scholarships 
and other aid to Tibetan refugees.24 The PRC expressed strong 
objections to the measure, insisting that Tibet had been a part of 
China and that such matters were China's internal affairs. The U.S. 
action, Chinese authorities maintained, threatened the continuation 
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of bilateral relations between the U.S. and the PRC.25 
Human Rights Raises Growing Concern 
The members of U.S. Congress and the U.S. President were not 
alone in expressing continuing concern over the situation of human 
rights. The American Buddhist Congress passed a resolution 
criticizing the transfer of population and asking Beijing to begin 
negotiations with the Dalai Lama.26 Although the issue received 
more attention because of the disturbances in the fall of 1987 and 
early 1988, the crises in human rights in Tibet has long attracted the 
attention of concerned humanitarians, religious leaders, and political 
leaders from throughout the world. 
Britain has established the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, 
an independent all-party group of more than one hundred members 
from both Houses of Parliament, the objective of which is to increase 
awareness in the British Parliament on international human rights 
abuses, to undertake fact-finding missions, and to publish reports 
about its human rights concerns. Lord Avebury, the Chairman of the 
Group, initiated correspondence with the Chinese Embassy in 
London on the human rights situation in Tibet, exchanging a series 
of letters between November 19, 1985 and March 3, 1987. The 
correspondence raised the issues of the persecution of Buddhism, the 
population transfer of Chinese into Tibet, and the maintenance of 
defense forces in Tibet. The Chinese proved evasive and eventually 
discontinued further correspondence on the subjectY 
A Chinese dissident, Chen Feng, discussed the tearing apart of the 
traditional system of religion and politics in Tibet and the efforts to 
destroy religion in order to replace it with Marxism and Leninism. 
He noted that the PRC military hardware and troops in Tibet are 
intended for use against the Tibetan people.2B 
An informal fact-finding tour, conducted March 29 to April 9 by 
former Labor Party Secretary of State for Health and Social Affairs, 
Lord David Ennals, concluded that Tibet was undergoing "a reign of 
terror" imposed by the PRC officials, and that conditions were worse 
than the nationality troubles in the Soviet Union. The report made 
reference to the March 5 demonstration and noted that it had been 
suppressed under conditions described as "severe." In a report which 
covers a wide range of issues, the section which concentrates on the 
current brutality occurring in Tibet deserves special attention: 
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A major problem in Tibet is the relative youth of military and 
military police, which combined with frustration at the Tibetans' 
attitude and orders to reestablish order, results in extremely 
brutality in their treatment of prisoners. 
Repeatedly we heard of how "electric cow prodders" were used 
both during the riot and as a means of torture. Only since leaving 
Tibet have we learnt that the personnel of the Public Security 
Bureau were issued with electric batons throughout China in 1980, 
and the severity of the charge they give can cause extreme pain 
and be temporarily disabling to an individual. With the wire coils 
unravelled they are used to strip the flesh from legs and arms. 
This was largely discovered from bodies which people were 
notified to collect from the hospital mortuary, with the require-
ment that they pay $150 collection fee. This used to be a common 
practice during the Cultural Revolution. 
At first we treated these reports with reserve but the consistency 
of the reports, the calibre of the witnesses and their undoubted 
fear left us in no doubt as to the veracity of the reports from 
people who had been detained.29 
The Continuing Crisis 
The Chinese Communist crackdown on the Tibetans continues in 
the short term and long term, and the Tibetans are under siege in 
their own land. Before leaving the plight of the Tibetans, we should 
focus on the conclusions of the reports detailing on the human rights 
abuses in this tortured land. Asia Watch was organized in 1985 to 
promote human rights in Asia and is affiliated with America Watch, 
Helsinki Watch, and Human Rights Watch. International Alert is a 
non-governmental alliance of groups and people who work for 
economic and social development as well on the protection and 
promotion of human rights. Asia Watch issued a February, 1988 
report with a July, 1988 update; InternationalAlert issued an August, 
1988 report. In its February report, Asia Watch observed: 
The moderation that may be said to characterize some of the 
policies implemented in the TAR (Tibet Autonomous Region) 
during the present decade does not extend into the realm of free 
political discourse of full religious freedom in spite of governmen-
tal insistence to the contrary.3D 
The report noted that Tibet may be considered a private affair 
only to the extent that "believers keep their faith within carefully 
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prescribed limits" and that these limits "can only be intended to 
hamper the propagation of religion in Tibet." The report added that 
religious institutions are not independent but are linked to the official 
Communist-sponsored Buddhist organizations and the "management 
board for cultural relics." Thus, Article 36 of the 1982 Chinese 
Constitution and Article 11 of the 1984 Law on Regional National 
Autonomy for Minority Nationalities, provisions which govern 
religious practices in Tibet, allow for wide interpretation of such 
terms as "disruption of public order" and "foreign domination."31 
The Asia Watch document detailed the work of the Public Security 
Bureau which maintains "effective surveillance" over the Tibetan 
population in most of the towns and cities. Those who speak out for 
Tibetan freedom are watched most closely; those who possess the 
Tibetan flag are charged with a major crime. Arrests are made 
during the middle of the night and the suspects are taken away and 
the interrogation is conducted in a PSB branch bureau in secret. 
Months or even years may elapse between the arrest and the official 
sentencing. Torture is used such as shackling the prisoners' arms and 
legs and "electric batons" are used. The Asia Watch report notes that 
even after interrogation and sentencing, abuse continues and with 
regular beatings of prisoners, restrictions are enforced against 
prisoners talking to one another, food is sparse and of poor quality, 
prisoners are required to work long hours at difficult tasks, and 
struggle sessions are conducted. Thus, it concludes that "torture is 
part of the prison routine in Tibet.,,32 
The Asia Watch Group details the names and persecutions of 
political prisoners in Tibet.33 The report also covers population 
transfers and provides evidence of discrimination against Tibetans by 
the Chinese officials, such as preferences for Chinese over Tibetans 
for jobs and housing in Tibet.34 
The July Report of Asia Watch describes a continuation of the 
persecution of the Tibetans with a special part on a list of additional 
political prisoners from both Tibetan exile sources and reflective of 
names from Tibetan exile lists and the lists of Amnesty International. 
The report also updates the March 5 riots, not covered in the 
February report and an event which received much less international 
attention than the fall 1987 demonstrations because the PRC had 
effectively closed Tibet off and few foreigners were present. The 
report details the continued efforts of arrest, imprisonment, torture, 
and terror. Asia Watch observed: 
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By itself, the extent of injuries reported by the official Chinese 
media (more than 300 members of the security forces wounded, 
of whom more than 30 reportedly required hospitalization) 
indicated the March 5 incident far exceeded the demonstrations 
of September and October in violence and numbers involved.35 
The International Alert report confirmed the general tone of the 
above observations and has been referenced earlier. This document 
placed special emphasis on the curtailment of freedom of speech in 
Tibet and the role of the Public Security Bureau which operates on 
the assumption that plots exist even when there is evidence to the 
contrary. Suspects, upon being arrested, are assumed to be guilty and 
Public Security officers set out to extract as much information as 
possible from the detainee. In the introduction to the report, Lord 
Ennals notes the important connection between domestic and 
international concerns: 
Since our return further demonstrations have occurred in Lhasa 
on a smaller scale than in March and there has been growing 
concern worldwide about the welfare of groups of Tibetans held 
by the Chinese and under threat of death. From recent travels in 
the United States and Europe I have discovered widespread 
concern about the situation in Tibet and an increasing amount of 
informed criticism of Chinese attitudes. 
The denial of human rights in Tibet must be dealt with not by 
continuing repression and force, but by statesmanship and in a 
genuine wish for peace. Urgent action is needed to avert a 
situation that would bring damage to China's reputation and to 
the Tibetan people.36 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Tibetan Crisis in the Post-Communist Era 
The collapse of communist power in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe carried the Tibetan crisis beyond the parameters of the four 
decades following China's invasion. This series of dramatic events, 
which spanned the period from 1989 to 1991, raised questions about 
the territorial status quo within the communist empire of Central 
Eurasia and required a broader re-examination of the concept of 
what constituted a nation. Throughout Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, nations are in the process of defining them-
selves. Nationalism, long thought to be eroded under the force of 
modernization, is now seen as one of the most powerful forces 
shaping the development of contemporary political structures. The 
collapse of Europe's communist regimes intensified nationalist 
aspirations in that region and undoubtedly revived the hopes of 
Tibetans who saw a parallel between their situation and that of the 
Baltic republics, which had been forcefully taken into the Soviet 
Union. 
Although China, with 56 different nationalities, is a multi-ethnic 
state, its minority population, 91 million people, accounts for only 8% 
of the national population. Therefore, a re-examination of the 
question of what constitutes a nation is less devastating for China 
than it was for the USSR. The Chinese situation is also less acute 
because China is a unitary state which is formally and in reality 
centralized. Chinese provinces, unlike their Soviet counterparts, are 
usually organized on the basis of territorial units instead of nationality 
groups. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule - Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Ningxia, Guangxi, and Inner Mongolia - and these are the 
regions that pose difficulties for Beijing. The ethnic problems of 
these regions, though modest by Soviet standards, are aggravated by 
a pattern of regionalism - authoritarian north versus modernizing 
south - that compounds this dilemma. Moreover, economic de-
mands, particularly the need for development of China's south-west 
and the tensions between local governments and private enterprises, 
further complicate the problem of these regions. Finally, it is 
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important to note that in spite of attem~ts at forced assimilation, 
China's ethnic minorities are evidently takmg steps to sharp~y ~efine 
their national identities, becoming more rather than less dl~tm~t. as 
groups. Significantly, this is a p~oce~~ th.at seems t~ be comcldl~g 
with the integration of Chinese mmontles mto the Chmese economIC 
and political system.! ..' 
As noted previously, the violence of th~ Tl~eta~-~hmese relatlOn-
ship since 1951 and the suppression o.f T,Ibet s reh~ous and cultural 
heritage have made Tibet one of Chma s most dIfficult cha.llenges. 
The latter 1980s described in previous chapters, were times of 
frequent and vioient anti-Chinese protest, a peri?d in wh.ich. the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) and other secunty organ~zatlOns 
were called upon, in official terminology, to "put down many nots and 
incidents of troublemaking." 
After a period of relative tranquility, there were outbursts of 
opposition in Tibet. As mentioned previously,. the events of 1988 
were especially significant because they were eVlden.ce of the r~t~rn 
of open resistance to central authority. The protests m 1989, bmldmg 
on the activism of 1988, were of profound significance not only 
because of what they demonstrated about the Tibetan situatio~ but 
also because they were an indication of just how far Clunese 
authorities would go to maintain control. Anti-Chinese demonstra-
tions in Lhasa in March, 1989, prompted a violent and rather well 
publicized response from the People's Armed Police. In actions 
which would be imitated a few weeks later in Tiananmen Square, the 
police killed over 100 monks, nuns, an? civilians who happene.d. to get 
in the way. These actions were rem forced by the Imposltlon of 
martial law. The renewal of protests early in this decade was a 
reminder of Tibet's continuing and even growing volatility. Overseas 
Tibetans and those Tibetans who reside elsewhere in China have 
protested against Beijing's brutal repression of Tibetan nationalist~ 
and have supported many of the aims Tibet's resistance movement.-
Contemporary Dissidence in Tibet ~. . 
There are several specific complklJili; that Tibetans have raised 
with regard to Chinese involvement in their region. Qn~, ofJ~e 
concerns which is most often mentioned is that the demQgrapJllc 
character of their homeland is being radicall altered by Han migratiori~~lndependent an ffilgratlon to ~i!!QIJtY .regiQns of Chi!la 
~-6rc()Urse, been a fact of life for ~ent.unes but It becam~ a s~ate 
sponsored initiative after the communIst VIctOry over the NatlOnalIsts. 
The Tibetan Crisis ill the Post-Communist Era 85 
F~o~ the ~arly 1980s ~ntil e.arly in this decade, approximately six 
millIon Chmese moved mto Tibet or those regions such as the Amdo 
Province which were formerly part of Tibet. Tibet has been dramati-
cally affected by this process but, in 1993, Gyaincain Norbu, the 
region's pro-Chinese governor, challenged claims that the Tibetans 
were being overrun with his statement that fewer that 4% of the 
people of Tibet have a Han Chinese ethnic background while 
approximately 96% of the population is ethnic Tibetans. In fact, 
governmental figures which are based on the smaller territory of what 
is now formally Tibet claim that the Tibetan population stands at 2.1 
mil~ion while ~here are only 79,000 Han Chinese who are permanent 
res~dents. ThIS figure does not take into account that large regions 
whlch were formerly part of Tibet have now been officially taken 
away and are overwhelmingly populated by Chinese settlers. Nor 
does it count the numerous Chinese military and security personnel 
w~o serv~ in Tibet. Looking at the original Tibetan territory, Tibetan 
eXlles claim that there is a total Tibetan population of 6 million and 
a permanent Chinese presences of 7.5 million. It is, of course, those 
areas taken from traditional Tibet which have been most devastated 
demographically. In describing conditions in Qinghai Province 
formerly the Tibetan Amdo Province, a Western journalist described 
the plight of Tibetans who had never even seen Chinese until the 
yea:s ~fter China's occupation of Tibet. Tibetan shepherds, he 
mamtamed, now find themselves deprived of their traditional pastures 
an~ have been fo:ced to move into the mountains in order to graze 
thelr sheep. While the communists have brought "roads, trains x-ray~, television and,~ measure of prosperity, ... they have also brou~ht 
theIr own people ... , a fact that has aroused considerable resentment 
on the part of natives of the region.3 
The movement o~ ethnic Chinese into the area has been supple-
mented by the practice of forced sterilizations and forced abortions 
of Tibetan women. Abortions have even been performed as late as 
six or seven months into pregnancies and there have been reports of 
truckloads of women being taken away for abortions or sterilizations. 
De~e?ders of Chinese poli~ies in Tibet argue that family planning 
polICIes are more relaxed m Tibet and that Tibetan peasants are 
allowed to have as many children as they wish and normally have 
anywhere from three to five. 4 
~n equally important concern is that Tibet has been singled out 
for .mvestme~t ventures by.Chinese authorities. Tibetan regulations, 
unlIke those m most of Chma, do not require that Chinese entrepre-
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neurs be local residents in order to set up business in Tibet. As a 
result, since the late 1980s, the region was flooded by thousands of 
Chinese, many of them mere teenagers dispatched by their ~oor rural 
families in Sichuan province, the traditional gateway to Tlbet, who 
have come in hopes of making a "fortune" off the region's ~owing 
tourist trade and other local opportunities. Consequently, TIbetans 
have come to fear that their traditional way of life is being eroded by 
the emergence of the bicycle and shoe repair shops, foreign res~a~­
rants, pedicab operations, bars and dance clubs ~?re characte.nstlc 
of Shanghai than Lhasa. Tibetan locals, ~eahzmg tha~ Chmese 
immigrants operate most of these new busmess enterpnses, have 
begun to fear a loss of Tibet's national character. M?~eover, m~ny 
of this new entrepreneurial class were seen as explOltlve, chargmg 
excessive prices that placed severe strains on local residents. 
Complaints about high prices charged b~ Chine~e merchants ~ed ~o 
five days of violent demonstrations agamst Chmese occupatIOn m 
May, 1993. Many arrests, injuries, and even deaths resulted 5 from 
clashes between PLA troops and thousands of demonstrators. 
It is important to recognize that during the 1980s, Chines~ refor~s 
resulted in economic advancement for all of the country, mcludmg 
the minority areas. However, not all regions of this enormous 
country derived equal benefits from the chan~es. The coasta~ and 
lowland regions of China, because of fortunate cIrcumstances, enjoyed 
by far the greatest benefits from this process. By comparison, 
minority living standards, including those of the Tibet~ns, already 
behind those of the Han regions, fell even further behmd. Conse-
quently, Tibet continues to face severe econ?mic h~rdships as w~ll as 
a sense of relative deprivation in companson wIth other regIons. 
Many protestors in recent demonstrations have carried signs and 
chanted slogans about economic hardships and other references to 
the difficulties of survival in an economy that has experienced 75% 
increases in the price of basic commodities. The prospect of dramat~c 
increases in the costs of basic fuels stimulated a sense of both pamc 
as well as hostility toward the Chinese and the Tibetan communists 
who supported them. Widespread corrupt.ion amon~ ~overnment 
workers intensified popular resentment agamst authontles. 
The emphasiS on economic modernization, regardless of the 
intentions of the authorities, has often prompted negative responses 
among the Tibetans because of the issues and the side-effects of this 
process. Among the most relevant of these issues is the question of 
who will direct the programs and who will benefit from those 
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programs. The impression that such programs advance the Han 
population more than the Tibetans has become a source of discontent 
and has intensified resistance rather than acceptance of the changes. 
Even the more or less uncontroversial instances of modernization 
suc? as improvements in the road network, have worked against th~ 
Chmese because they have supported improvements in communica-
tions critical of the "modernizers". Thus, improved communications 
?ave meant t?at dis.sident information has spread more quickly and 
mto the prevIously Isolated rural areas. While the Chinese suggest 
that they have brought "civilization" to a "barbarian" Tibet the 
Tibetans regard the Chinese as little more than "outsiders" inte~t on 
colonizing their country.6 In short, there have been severe limits to 
the positive results to be achieved by such an endeavor if only 
because of the complex and interdependent relationship among 
economic, social, and political concerns. 
Some of the most recent demonstrations in Tibet are clear 
evidence in support of the argument that modernization is a sensitive 
process which is very difficult to control and direct. The 1993 
disturbances illustrate this phenomenon and show how the Chinese 
authorities have become captives of a process that they set in motion. 
The protests began as an economic dispute but the confrontation was 
quickly transformed into a political one. Demonstrators complained 
a~out the consequences of central policies in Tibet and eventually 
TIbetan flags were unfurled in Lhasa's main square. The flags, of 
course, drew further attention to Tibet's persistent independence 
movement and were a reminder of the persistence of the national 
~dea a~ong these ~~mote people. The arrests of several flag wavers 
mtensified the polItIcal drama, heightened nationalistic feelings, and 
eventually led the European Community to protest the Tibetan 
human rights situation. 
The process of.m?dernization u?dertaken by authorities in Beijing 
has ha~ a draI?atl~ Impa~t on envIronmental conditions throughout 
the natIon. TIbet m partIcular has felt this impact. Therefore, the 
ecological devastation of Tibet, an event which mirrors the destruc-
tion of the Soviet environment, especially that of non-Russian areas un~er .Mosco.w's direction, has become another important concer~ 
actIvatmg reSIstance to Chinese control. The clear-cutting of ancient 
forests, ~ c?mmon. Chinese practice in Tibet, has been particularly 
destructIve m that It has escalated the erosion of the region's topsoil. 
As a result of China's forestry policies, the once flourishing forests of 
Tibet have been devastated and a total of over 100,000 square miles 
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has been completely deforested. This figure, it is important to note, 
constitutes one-sixth of the Tibetan land mass.
7 
The mining of Tibetan mineral deposits, conducted with complete 
disregard of environmental requirem~nts, h.as had an equally 
devastating ecological impact. Uramum mmes ha:e ~een an 
especially important source of environmental damage m Tl~et. In 
1993, there were numerous reports that for two decades Chma had 
been using Tibet as a dumping ground for nuclear wastes. One 
nuclear research site in particular, the Northwest Nuclear Weapons 
Research and Design Academy, has produced enorm?~s amount~ of 
nuclear wastes since the 1960s. Suspicions that authontles have failed 
to enforce safety standards for radioactive materials have been fueled 
by the extremely high incidence of ca?ce.r in locations n~ar nuclear 
waste storage facilities. Because of mdI~fer.ence to envIronmental 
concerns, many Tibetans have suffered slgmfica~t h~alth probl~ms 
after eating meat which had been exposed to radlOact~ve con~amma­
tion. Loose controls at nuclear sites have made It p.osslble for 
ordinary citizens to enter these areas, even those ~n WhICh .nuclear 
tests were conducted in recent years, and remove Items WhIch they 
regard as useful. Consequently, parts from airplanes and. tanks as 
well as artillery pieces have been taken away by people who mnocent-
ly thought they could convert them to safe personal use. L.acal 
officials who don't understand the threat posed by nuclear reSIdue 
have not been inclined to prevent such dangerous activities.
s 
I.n 
another action, completely unrelated to any form of economIC 
modernization, China has used Tibet as a base for nuclear weapons 
as well as powerful non-nuclear weapons. With increasing frequency, 
Tibetans have objected to these actions not only because the TIbetans 
themselves are a peaceful people but also because they realize that 
such sites are having significant, negative ecological effects. Rece~tly, 
activists have maintained that there were three such weapons SItes 
with missiles targeted against India.9 
The Scope of Dissent . 
Chinese officials have long argued that most TIbetans support 
their administration of Tibet and that dissident activities are confined 
to Lhasa and nearby localities. In recent years, however, it. ?as 
become obvious that dissidents are active in many other commumtles. 
Reports of protests, leafletting activitie~, and demo~str.ations in 
support of the Dalai Lama in remote TIbetan towns mdicate that 
unrest has spread well beyond the confines of Lhasa. An especially 
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significant demonstration took place in Shigatse, the site of a 
monastery where monks were responsible for choosing a new 
Panchen Lama, the second most important Tibetan religious figure, 
second only to the Dalai Lama. The purpose of that demonstration 
was a demand that the Panchen Lama be chosen only with the 
approval of the Dalai Lama, an arrangement that would have limited 
Chinese influence on the selection process thus barring selection of 
a pro-Chinese Tibetan.1O Activism, according to numerous reports, 
has also spread into Tibetan communities in Sichuan and other 
Tibetan communities outside Tibet. In addition, the ranks of 
dissidents have expanded considerably in terms of the types of people 
involved and it is no longer the case that only members of the 
Tibetan religious community are participants in this cause. Business-
men and teachers are increasingly appearing among the ranks of 
those arrested for their involvement in dissident activities. This 
confirms suggestions that demands for independence have spread into 
Tibet's professional and intellectual community and are no longer 
limited to the Buddhist faithful. ll 
Official Responses to Unrest 
Chinese authorities have used a variety of tactics in their effort 
to suppress the Tibetan independence movement. In many 
respects, the Chinese have been especially repressive in dealing 
with Tibet while in others they have been somewhat relaxed 
and generous. The military and political weapons that they 
have used emphasize the repressive features of Beijing's 
Tibetan policies while their social and economic initiatives have 
underscored their ability to appear generous in dealing with 
dissidents in this remote region. The repeated condemnations 
of "splittists" have been a key element in their political strategy. 
Party propagandists describe the "splittist philosophy" as a 
remnant of the class struggle. While they argue that the class 
struggle has been eradicated as the "major contradiction" 
officials suggest that it does persist in Tibet and that, in thi~ 
region, the "class struggle will continue to exist for a long time 
... and may worsen under certain conditions." Since the 
"domestic and international class struggles are always linked 
together," it is inevitable, they maintain, that the Tibetan class 
struggle has intensified with the increase in international 
attention to the Tibetan situation. Without outside interfer-
ence, authorities argue, resistance to Tibet's incorporation into 
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China would have faded and eventually died. In 1993 Gyain-
cain Norbu denounced what he described as "evil plots of 
splittists at home and abroad to split the motherland': and 
suggested that they were the main threat to the secunty of 
Tibet.12 
Beijing's political campaign has not been limited to repetiti~us 
denunciations of "splittism." Rather, it has been supplemented WIth 
a comprehensive educational camp~ign in Tibetan .schools. As part 
of this effort at political socialization, party offiCials demand that 
public schools intensify those general elements of their curriculum 
which stress Tibet's role as part of the PRe. The objective of this 
program is to inculcate a belief that Tibet and China are part of one 
historical entity and to encourage students to r?ject the "hostile ~orces 
abroad" which are, with the aid of the Dalai Lama, attem?tmg to 
interfere with China's internal affairs. Special booklets aImed at 
juvenile readers, classroom lectures, p~rty and Com~unist Youth 
League activities, special report meetmgs, and s?mma:s ~or all 
students are the instruments that are used for dissemmatlon of 
officially sanctioned themes.13 
Propaganda, of course, has not been restricted to the classro~ms 
of TibefDufh~ile& extended to the -general populatIOn. 
One ofihe-be~t illustrations of this occurred in 1991 on the occasion 
of the 40th anniversary of the "peaceful liberation of Tibet" by the 
Chinese. Elaborate and lavish plans for the ceremony commemorat-
ing this event were developed by the Chinese. A major p~,opagan~a 
theme developed for the official program was that econ~m~c 
modernization" and social advancement were consequences ofChma s 
occupation of Tibet. While the New York City-ba~ed Tibet House 
organized numerous events during that s.a~.e pen?d to ce~ebra~e 
Tibetan culture and, by implication, to cntlClze Chmese actIOns m 
Tibet the Chinese authorities claimed that Tibet's liberation was 
bein~ celebrated in 28 different nations, glibly su~e~ting th~t the 
Tibet House events constituted acceptance of Chma s role m the 
region. In order to prevent disruption of the official events, Chin?se 
authorities placed restrictions on travel to Lhasa and surroundmg 
districts. Overseas Tibetans, likely to object to official themes, were 
excluded from visits to Tibet during this time.14 In addition to 
limiting contacts with overseas Tibetans who might limit the impact 
of official propaganda themes, authorities have a~~o taken steps. to 
ban the relay into Tibet of ?rograms of the Bntlsh Bro~d~5astmg 
Corporation and other agenCIes of the Western news media. 
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Another element of the political campaign against Tibetan 
dissidents is the State Security Law. Passed in 1993, this law was, in 
the words of Li Hui, an official in Tibet's State Security Department, 
intended to "defend the political power of the people's democratic 
dictatorship and the socialist system .... " In practical terms of its 
application in Tibet, the 1993 State Security Law has been an 
instrument in Beijing's propaganda war against separatists. According 
to Li Hui's report, the law has had several effects on Tibetan security 
organs. First, the state security police have devoted a great deal of 
time to studying the law. Second, they have distributed "more than 
2,000 wall charts and more than 20,000 booklets on the law." Third, 
they have worked to mobilize and "exploit public opinion" in support 
of this legislation through a variety of instruments, including such 
things as dramatic presentations on television. Finally, in a move that 
is particularly significant for what it tells us about "security" problems, 
they have focused and intensified "propaganda and education" efforts 
for specific groups. In his explanation of this component of their 
program, Li Hui complained that "leaders .~nd functionaries at some 
units handling external relations have ... gone so far as to create 
obstructions ... ", thus making it difficult to advance state security 
work. Because of this attitude, Li Hui explained, there had not been 
an adequate effort to enforce the State Security Law in certain 
regions. Enforcement was especially lax in "rural and frontier 
regions" where some "units and individuals" have completely ignored 
the demands of the new law.16 
The specific purpose of the State Security Law was clarified with 
Li Hui's discussion of how the law related to Tibet's dissident 
movement. "Hostile forces" outside Tibet, he explained, have never 
stopped their efforts to undermine China's state security. Li Hui 
charges that, as part of their campaigns against China, external forces 
are manipulating the Tibetan separatist movement. As a result, 
members of the separatist movement are attempting to get political, 
economic, scientific, and military secrets which they can pass on to 
foreign powers. In addition to acting as agents for foreign intelli-
gence services, the so-called "splittists" are, in Li Hui's view, linked 
with outside activists who hope to de-stabilize the Chinese political, 
economic, and social system. The State Security Law, he maintains, 
will help officials "expose the splittists" and will encourage average 
citizens to oppose their efforts to undermine the Chinese state 
systemY 
Military instruments have played an important role in the 
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suppression of Tibetan dissent. By the time of the 1~91 anniv:rsary 
of Tibet's occupation, the combined strengths of secunty forces l~ the 
region _ army, Public Security Bureau, and People's ~.rmed ~ohce -
was more or less equal to the entire Tibetan populatIO.n and m 1?94, 
Lodi Gyara, president of the International .Ca~palgn for TIbet, 
reported that there are as many Chinese soldIers m Lh~sa ~s th:re 
are Tibetans.18 One observer noted the irony of a situ~tl?n l~ w~lch 
decorations proclaiming the success of the Chinese mISSIon ~n TIbet 
were being displayed as convoys of military vehicl~s moved mt? the 
city and city streets were being patrolled by heaVIly armed Chmese 
soldiers.19 . . . . . 
A more sophisticated role for the Chinese mIlItary m dealmg WIth 
Tibet was reflected in a development program of the Pe?ples 
Liberation Army (PLA) which, over a period Of. five yea~~, u~Ihzed 
civilian aircraft to transport Chinese troops to TI~et. UtilIzation of 
this airlift capability, something which was an Important part. ?f 
China's overall military reform program, gave the. ~LA the capabIlIty 
of rapid deployment to the region. in tim~s of cnSlS. It was also an 
important and useful innovation m that It protected the health .of 
troops by eliminating an arduous overland journey wh~ch. otherw.lse 
would have been made by trucks. For the PLA, thIS l~novatl?n 
served the dual purpose of promoting regional ~ecun~y whIle 
simultaneously advancing PLA military reforms. The mtenslty of the 
effort was demonstrated by the fact that in a period Of. four yea~s 
over 400 airlifts were conducted. In order to support thI~ dramatIc 
increase in air traffic, the runway at Lhasa's Go~ggar alf~ort was 
expanded, making it the longest in Chin~. :hIS ~xpansIOn also 
supported efforts to reduce Tibet's phYSIcal IsolatIOn.. Another 
example of the use of the military to respond to of~ctal fe~rs of 
unrest came in December, 1993, when for the first .tlme, Tlb~t~n 
military recruits were stationed outside Tibet. Wh~le ~u~hont.les 
asserted that this measure was intended to reduce TIbet ~ lsolatlon 
from the rest of China, it also served the purpose of takmg young 
Tibetans out of their homeland during a time of unr~st, thus 
removing them from the site of a conflict in .which they mIght well 
have chosen to resist Beijing's control over TIbet. At th~ ceremo~y 
marking their departure, officials described service ou.tside of the~r 
homeland as a great opportunity for the young men ~o mc:ease ,~~elr 
understanding of their country and to "broaden theIr honz?ns: -
An examination of military promotions in the early ~990s mdlcates 
that central authorities are especially willing to recogmze and reward 
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those who have effectively directed programs to suppress the 
independence movement. The Chinese, like so many others, have 
learned the utility of the promotion list as an instrument of policy. 
The promotion of Zhang Zhu, the political commissar of Tibet's 
Regional People's Armed Police Corps and the individual who 
directed the effort to suppress activists involved in the 1993 unrest, 
illustrates this. In recognition of his efforts, Zhang Zhu was 
promoted to the rank of major general and accorded the praise 
normally reserved for national heroes of the highest order. Zhang 
Zhu was hailed as a great military leader who was responsible for 
successfully countering the efforts of "anti-Chinese" forces determined 
to destroy China's state system and, in particular, preserving Tibet's 
stability.21 
The history of counter-insurgency efforts demonstrates the 
importance of having military forces lay what is seen as a "construc-
tive" rather than a purely repressive role. One of the best illustra-
tions of the value of this tactic was the civic action programs of the 
Bolivian military in the late 1960s when that nation was threatened 
by an insurgency led by Che Guevarra. The Chinese military seems 
to be aware of this lesson and, perhaps as a result of this, its efforts 
to improve regional stability have not been confined to the purely 
r~pressive but have also included civic action programs designed to 
wm popular support. One of their programs has included an effort 
to, as they put it, "protect the monasteries" by establishing patrols 
which presumably prevent vandalism aimed against monasteries. The 
Chinese military has, in addition, supported various local construction 
projects, often joining with carpenters and others at construction sites. 
Natural disasters have given the military another valuable opportunity 
to show that it plays a constructive role in Tibet and should, there-
fore, be regarded as an ally. One of the most mundane projects 
undertaken by the Chinese forces has been its best publicized effort. 
!n th~ early 1990s, the military began a street maintenance program 
m ~hlCh PLA officers and soldiers stationed in Lhasa would attempt 
to Improve the appearance of the city's streets by keeping them swept 
and cleared of litter. In another important move, Chinese authorities 
began to recruit pro-Chinese Tibetans who could be trained as 
officers for the Chinese army. Hoping that their presence among the 
officers corps would improve the PLA's relationship with the locals 
authorities elevated numerous pro-Chinese Tibetans into service a~ 
military officers. In 1993, authorities claimed that two-thirds of the 
PLA officers were ethnic Tibetans and that four former Tibetan serfs 
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were now serving as PLA major generals.22 • • 
The effort to give Chinese efforts a greater TIbetan .complexion 
has included a focus on the Buddhist religious commumty. As. pa~t 
of this endeavor military training teams were s~nt ~o many of TI~~t s 
largest monasteries in the late 1980s. The objective of the trammg 
teams was to encourage monks to develop a greater sense .of 
responsibility. As part of this, military aut?orities"set ~)Ut to modI~ 
the Buddhists scriptures in such a way as to I~cl~de ~atlOn~l de~ense 
as part of that religious doctrine. This tactic IS an I~tensificatlOn of 
earlier efforts to create a Marxist variation of BuddhIsm and reflects 
a more sophisticated view of how to deal with the persistence of the 
Buddhist faith in Tibet. 
The cultivation of Tibetan religious leaders is another important 
part of official efforts to make their programs mor~ palatable ~o. the 
local populace. The official objective is to identify local rel~¥.lo~s 
figures who might, in some way, become advocates of BeIJmg s 
policies in Tibet. From time to tiI?e, buddl~as. and lamas who are 
members of the Chinese BuddhISt ASSOCiation have produced 
declarations of Chinese responsibility for whatever progress has t~ken 
place in Tibet over the past fou~ decade~. . At the same time, 
spokesmen for the Chinese BuddhISt ASSOCiation ?ave argued ~hat 
"reactionary forces abroad" are involved in a campaign t? sever. TIb~t 
from the Chinese socialist family of which it is, they claim, a histonc 
component. . . . 
Chinese efforts. to enlist elements of the Budd ~s 
community to supportBeljings-Tll5etafi po ICIes lave not been hmlted 
to these relatively restrained measures. In an effort to ensure. that 
those who do not respond to official efforts to support Chmese 
policy, Tibetan officials are asking t~lat the Chinese Comm~ni,~t Party 
"closely monitor Tibetan monastenes and places ?f worshIp .. Chen 
Kuiyuan, first secretary of the Tibetan ~o~I~lUm~,t Party, sald t~at 
such an action was necessary because cnmmals had been usmg 
religion as a cover for illegal activities. I~ Chen's view, a ~ampa~gn 
to disrupt the "historic unity" of the Chmese peopl~, WIth Ch~na 
including Tibet, was being mounte~ by both. domestI~ and fore~gn 
separatist forces. An important vehIcle for thIS campaIgn, acc?~dmg 
to Chen is Buddhist religious organizations. Not surpnsmgly, 
Chinese ~fficials have underscored this view with restrictions on the 
nation's religious orders. Those restrictions were made public late in 
1993 with the announcement of limits on the number of monks and 
nuns who could be granted admission into the Buddhist order. As 
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justification for these limits, the leader of one of Tibet's monasteries , 
the Dajin Monastery, declared that monasteries in Tibet were simply 
too poor to support a large number of monks and nuns. Many 
monks, he explained, were required to live on alms from worshippers 
because the monastery didn't have sufficient funds to support them. 
The restrictions, therefore, were justified as a measure that would 
help make the monasteries self-supporting institutions. An additional 
justification for the restrictions, the leader insisted, was that having 
fewer members in the order would probably improve the quality of 
the membership and keep out individuals such as those politically 
activist nuns and monks who have supported Tibet's independence 
movement. In addition to limits on membership in the order, Tibetan 
officials instituted a series of new regulations to limit the activities of 
monks and nuns. One of the most significant regulations was the 
prohibition on monks entering tea houses, restaurants and other 
places where political activists gather. Under the regulations, monks 
have to obtain permission in order to be away from the monastery for 
a period of more than two weeks. Monks who violate this regulation 
are subject to dismissal from the order and face the prospect of other 
legal actions against them. Increased physical security around many 
of Tibet's monasteries is another indication of a determination to 
monitor the activities of the religious community. In 1994, officials 
established a network of blockade and military checkpoints on the 
roads to monasteries in the vicinity of Lhasa. In many cases, military 
installations have been established next to or within sight of monas-
teries.23 Religious orders associated with political activism have 
been subjected to especially severe measures, a fact that was 
illustrated at the Garu nunnery, an institution located a few miles 
north of Lhasa, in 1993. At the Garu nunnery, a political "re-
education" unit was instituted in an effort to correct what officials saw 
as the "political immaturity" of the members of the order. The Garu 
nunnery is one of Tibet's largest and has a long record of support for 
Tibet's independence movement. In recent crackdowns, many nuns 
were imprisoned because of their political activism. Officials have 
indicated that if the activism of the nuns continues, the nunnery may 
be subjected to the ultimate sanction of a complete shutdown.24 
Repressive measures taken against Tibet's religious institutions 
have been accompanied by a general increase in official efforts to 
suppress religious activities in China. Members of the Christian 
underground, estimated by 1993 to have reached 60 or 70 million 
have increasingly been detained, fined, and often tortured. Fines fa; 
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. . tin s generally imposed by Public 
organizing "illegal" rehglOus mee g from as little as $67 to as much 
Security officials in rural.ar~as, ra~~emeetings are rarely granted, all 
as $938. Bec.ause perml~s or su re financial penalties. Since the 
religious servIces are subJ~ct to s=~e documentation, they amount to 
fines are rarely accompamed by y h· h no appeals can be made to 
little more tha~. official robbery ~~:Ce~~ Christians' livestock, crops, 
higher authontles. In some pr d Uncooperative Christians are 
and even furniture are confiscat~ . I disappeared.25 
often to.rtured whil~ man~ have :~~~r~ of outright repression as a 
In VIew .of the m.conslsten~ined ethnic groupS, the Chinese have 
weapon agamst espeCially deter t· to natl·onalism Consequent-
.. an alterna lVe . 
offered modermzatlo~ as 1. curity interests are better served 
ly, authorities recogm~e that t leI~ S~ith the demonstrated ability of 
by successful economIC program
t
·
t 
draw upon economic grievances 
Tibet's independence mov~men 0 Chinese authorities obviously 
as well ad political and social concler~s, sound economic policies for 
recognize the importanc~ of ~e~h opm~emonstrated the volatility of 
the region. The 1993 n~ts I~ asa 0 ular protests against price 
this combination o.f motlvatl~~~ a~e~ t~ several days of demonstra-
increases .on esse~tIaI commo ;i~~an officials have been candid in 
tions agamst Chmese .rule. .. . Tbet have been poor and that 
admitting that economIC ~ondltlO~~.m i~ well below China's national 
the per capita inc.ome of ItS P;tbU ~~~~nal People's Congress, Chen 
average. Speakmg at. the, ional party committee, admitted that 
Kuiyuan, secre~ary ofTlbe.t s reg rates were a source of economic 
Tibet's industnal and agn~ultu~al Chen Kuiyuan argued, would 
. T·b t's economIC relorms, - . dIfficulty. Ie. d. for all minority areas and, m so 
enhance the economIC stan mg . I ·t 26 
1 Ch·na's natlona um y. 
doing, would strengt len d I f form policies designed to improve 
Against the ba.c~groun 0 ~~tizens authorities have taken steps 
the standards of hvmg of PR~ I .~ rove the material benefits 
to initiate programs that WI a ~o .. ~ p dismisses Tibetan taxes due 
enjoyed by Tibetans. Each year, deI)lng llere from $200 million to 
nt and exten s anyw 
the central governme. b. d· According to recent figures, only 
$300 million in eco~~mlc su SI les. I fact Tibetans are the only 3,2~2 Tibeta~ famIlIes p~y t~:~~fit: from' such generous taxation 
Chmese ethmc group wInch . t ntly justify these measures as 
policies and Chinese o.ffici,al!c~~~~i~ and commercial development. 
necessary to promote TIbet s r cies Chinese officials have been 
In addition to these generous tax PO,,1 an~ther instrument for promo-
boasting that the "market economy , 
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tion of greater material benefits, was being established in Tibet. 
Tibet's "market economy" features more important preferential taxing 
policies as well as program extending loans for entrepreneurial 
projects and measures which would allow individuals to lease land. 
In connection with the programs of this "market economy", authori-
ties have approved numerous joint projects between Tibetan 
enterprises and enterprises in cities elsewhere in China. As a tribute 
to the emergence of a new entrepreneurial class, the number of 
individual businessmen in Lhasa increased dramatically. In 1980, 
there were only five hundred Tibetan private commercial endeavors. 
By 1994, this number had risen to 14,000, most of which are, 
authorities insist, operated by local ethnic Tibetans. According to 
official statistics, there are 40,487 individual households involved in 
some aspect of private industrial and commercial ventures and 29,483 
of them are Tibetans. In 1994, officials opened a securities exchange 
operation in Lhasa as part of an effort to encourage commercial 
growth.27 
The success of Chinese economic policies, according to Beijing, is 
seen not only in the emergence of a "market economy", but is also 
demonstrated by increases in Tibet's gross domestic output. GDP for 
1993, they insist, had risen above the 1992 GDP figure by 8.1%. 
Even agriculture, that most difficult segment of any nation's economy, 
has, according to authorities, improved under the force of Beijing's 
policies. As evidence, they cite what they describe as six consecutive 
years of increasingly abundant harvests. Extensive capital projects in _ 
energy, transportation, and telecommunication have been an 
important feature of central policies for Tibet. Under plans which 
were announced in 1994, all of southwest China, including Tibet, is 
to become a major source of hydroelectric power for the Chinese 
nation.28 This plan, not only of great significance for the PRC's 
national economy, will also do much to intensify the development of 
Tibet. Another component of the developmental plan for Tibet has 
been an important upgrading of the region's highways. By 1994, the 
Heihe-Gamdo Highway was complete and important renovations were 
being undertaken on sections of the China-Nepal Highway as well as 
the road networks leading into Qinghai Province and into Sichuan.29 
Improvements in the road network of this isolated region are 
essential for improving tourism and foreign trade, both of which are 
crucial for the development of south-west China. An emphasis on 
foreign trade, in particular, has emerged as an economic mainstay for 
the region and rose by 55% in 1993. The stress on tourism, some-
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what restrained because of Chinese concern over who might actually 
visit Tibet, has led to an increase in the number of tourists coming 
into Lhasa. In 1994, 26,000 foreign tourists visited Tibet, an 
especially significant figure because in the recent past most foreigners 
had been barred from the area. Yet, there are limits to the Tibetan 
reform process and, while most economic specialists recognize that 
the region's greatest potential might lie in the development of a 
tourist industry which would attract considerable amounts of hard 
currency, the Chinese authorities refuse to make concessions on this 
point. From the viewpoint of communist authorities, such a develop-
mental strategy was, because of the intensification of political 
dissidence the region, regarded as far too risky.3D 
Following the violence of 1988 and 1989, authorities recognized 
that the difficult relationship between Tibetans and Chinese might be 
eased through simple and obvious measures such as better communi-
cations. In order to facilitate this, Hu Jintao, after arriving in Tibet 
in January, 1989 to become head of the Tibetan Communist Party, 
required Chinese cadres under the age of 45 to take a course in the 
Tibetan language. Many governmental departments began to devote 
half a day each week for language instruction in the office.31 
Where the more sophisticated or specialized responses to unrest 
have fallen short of their goals, Chinese authorities have not hesitated 
to supplement them with the direct and often brutal methods most 
commonly associated with dictatorships. By 1994, it was known that 
Lhasa alone had six prisons which, at any time, held hundred of 
political prisoners. According to human rights analysts, from 1993 to 
1994, the number of political prisoners held in Lhasa's six prison 
camps rose by 30%. Many of the prisoners were held incommunica-
do and were often subjected to endless interrogations and beatings. 
Elsewhere in Tibet, while the exact number of regional prisons and 
labor camps is unknown, it is widely believed that it is a system 
capable of holding large numbers of dissidents. There have been 
reports that in recent years thousands of Tibetans have died in the 
notorious Xining labor complex in Qinhai province, a huge region 
which was once part of Tibet and is now believed to hold perhaps ten 
million Chinese prisoners?2 Official designation of a variety of 
seemingly harmless activities, such as the possession of a book by the 
Dalai Lama or the display of a Tibetan flag, as criminal offenses and 
a large network of informers guarantee that this penal system is 
always full and that tens of thousands of Tibetans live in fear.33 The 
highest communist officials of Tibet are determined to maintain such 
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repressive measures, a commitment that was underscored in 1993 by 
the Communist Party's call for a further crackdown on so-called 
"separatists." Charging that some party cadres speak as though they 
are loyal supporters of the party's policies in Tibet while they are, in 
fact, secret supporters of the Dalai Lama, the leadership has called 
for a purge of suspected cadres. In moves associated with this 
declaration, a large number of accused "separatists" were sentenced 
to prison terms averaging seven and one-half years. In addition, the 
mayor of Lhasa, who had consistently supported party policies on the 
Tibetan dissidents, was removed from his position because the 
leadership felt that his actions against demonstrators were to reserved 
while two pro-independence demonstrators were executed.34 
Tibet as a Contemporary International Issue 
As was noted previously, Tibet has enjoyed inconsistent success in 
attracting other nations to join it in resisting its incorporation into 
China. The British and U.S. historical record illustrates the difficul-
ties inherent in enlisting such support. Because both nations have 
sought good relations with the Chinese, they have avoided recognition 
of Tibetan independence, fearing that such an action would be seen 
as an effort to detach Tibet from China. British and American 
commercial interests have often been the motivations of a policy that 
seemed to ignore Tibetan protests.35 
Yet, in spite of this historical record of reluctance, the Tibetan 
issue has made its way onto the international agenda, especially in 
recent years. Apparently contained since the end of China's self- ,-
imposed isolation in the early 1970s, it re-emerged as an international 
issue in the post-communist era. As Tibetan resistance again 
assumed an active, militant tone, the attention of world governments 
was increasingly focused upon Tibet's plight. The Dalai Lama, 
continually traveling around the world visiting governmental leaders 
and opinion-makers, served as a constant reminder of an atrocity of 
the 1950s and informed all who would listen that the consequences 
of the Chinese invasion of Tibet were still being felt with dramatic 
and tragic impact. 
In April, 1991, the Dalai Lama enjoyed one of his most important 
diplomatic and political triumphs when he met with the President of 
the United States. President George Bush, in meeting with the Dalai 
Lama, combined both Tibetan and U.S. interests by, firstly, calling 
attention to shortcomings in China's human rights policy and, 
secondly, coupling criticisms of Chinese human rights violations with 
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a denunciation of China's arms sales policy, a policy which was 
associated with the promotion of instability in regions important to 
American interests. Shortly after meeting with President Bush, the 
Dalai Lama also met with members of the U.S. Congress who joined 
in denouncing China's continued occupation of Tibet. A Congressio-
nal resolution formalized the United States' opposition to China's 
role in Tibet and attempted to pressure Beijing to modify its behavior 
in that region. U.S. interest in the Tibetan situation was reflected in 
its decision in 1991 to change immigration policy in order to allow 
1,000 Tibetans, classified as refugees, to enter the United States. In 
the previous twenty years, only 500 Tibetans had entered the U.S. and 
no American administration had been willing to extend refugee status 
to displaced Tibetans.36 
The change of administrations in the United States did not inhibit 
the American concern for the Tibetan situation. In April, 1994, the 
Dalai Lama met with President Bill Clinton and Vice President AI 
Gore for a discussion of China's violations of religious and cultural 
rights in Tibet. Although the administration did eventually renew its 
most favored nation trade relationship with China, administration 
spokesmen declared that China's human rights record, especially as 
it related to Tibet, was one of the factors taken into account in 
making a decision on MFN renewal.37 Just prior to a meeting 
between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign 
Minister, Chinese authorities, obviously aware of U.S. and Western 
concern over its Tibetan human rights record, released two Tibetan 
dissidents who had been detained though not yet charged with any 
specific offenses.38 In spite of renewing most favored nation trade 
status with China, the U.S. government continued to support many 
of the concerns of the Tibetan resistance movement. In 1994, the 
U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, raised an important 
concern for Tibetans when he asked the Chinese government to 
provide information about 106 people believed to be imprisoned in 
Tibet because of religious or political views.39 It is, however, 
important to note that while the United States supports protection of 
human rights and argues that the Tibetans have the right to enjoy a 
distinct cultural identity, it does recognize Tibet as being, in a 
political sense, part of China. The administration's concern for 
protecting human rights in Tibet was reflected in a specific demand 
that Chinese officials agree to open a dialogue with the Dalai 
Lama.40 The position of the U.S. Congress is somewhat more 
emphatic. Evidence of the Congressional attitude appeared in the 
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1994 foreign relations authorization bill which described Tibet as an 
"occupied sovereign country".41 
Unrest in Tibet has routinely motivated foreign criticism of 
China's human rights record and forced Chinese authorities to 
respond in a manner that has made the Tibetan issue more and more 
of an international issue. When thousands of Tibetans protested 
against price increases in the spring of 1993, Chinese authorities 
responded by suggesting that foreign intervention rather than local 
conditions had caused the disturbances. While the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry insisted that the incident was a purely "internal" matter, Ta 
Kung Pau, a Beijing-owned newspaper published in Hong Kong, 
insisting that local residents were pleased by official suppression of 
the protests, argued that foreign "secret agents", working with local 
provocateurs, had sparked the riots. According to the paper, "secret 
agents" entered Tibet as tourists and, taking advantage of local 
problems, encouraged residents to oppose Beijing's authority. The 
"secret agents", according to Ta Kung Paa, were working in conjunc-
tion with "anti-Chinese forces" and "pro-Dalai Lama separatists", 
evidently in an effort to embarrass the Chinese government as the 
United States was considering renewal of most-favors-nation trade 
status for China.42 In 1994, Chinese authorities arrested and 
deported two American tourists who had been accused of distributing 
tapes of the Dalai Lama's teachings.43 
While the immediate post-Maoist era brought some modest 
improvements in the Tibetan situation, it did little to alter the 
difficult circumstances of Tibet's population. However, the years 
since 1989, a period that we generally describe as the post-communist 
era, have brought more dramatic and fundamental changes. These 
changes have involved intensification of popular resistance to 
continued Chinese occupation of Tibet as well as other minority areas 
such as Xinjiang Province. For the Tibetans and other minorities, the 
message of the breakup of the Soviet Union was that national 
identities can endure in spite of decades of repressive colonial 
policies. Consequently, the Tibetan national idea is being reasserted 
today by people who, in most cases, have known only Chinese 
control. The activism of this younger generation of Tibetans, like the 
struggles of the millions of Soviet citizens who resisted Moscow's 
control, is further evidence of the resiliency of nationalism as an 
important political force in the latter twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Options for Resolution of the Tibetan Crisis 
Students of international relations are accustomed to thinking in 
terms of how problems can be resolved. The Tibetan crisis, however, 
with its periodic explosions, has existed since the Chinese occupation 
of the region in 1950 and, consequently, has become almost routine. 
International problems viewed as routine are, all too often, accepted 
as part of the natural order and simply ignored by those speculating 
about a resolution of those problems. It is, therefore, important to 
summarize the nature of the current situation and to consider various 
options by which the Tibetan problem might be resolved and to 
evaluate those options in terms of their feasibility. 
It is possible to identify a series of steps that have been taken by 
the Chinese authorities in an effort to mold Tibet into Beijing's 
desired image. Most of these measures are not unique to the Tibetan 
situation and can be observed in many regions of the world in which 
powerful forces are attempting to subdue nationalist aspirations. In 
1993, A. M. Rosenthal, writing in The New York Times, prepared 
what he referred to as a "guide for ethnic cleansers" which summa-
rized many of the official measures being taken in places such as 
Tibet and Yugoslavia. First, authorities attempt to remove as much 
of the indigenous population as possible without destroying the entire 
native infrastructure. The plan is that, eventually, it will be complete-
ly replaced but that such an action is not possible immediately. 
Second, authorities will set out to remove native civic leaders and 
replace them with individuals loyal to the dominant power. Third, it 
is necessary to destroy most places of worship and arrest native 
religious leaders. Fourth, the "cleansing" power will ban the teaching 
of the local languages and bring in teachers who will stipport the 
complete restructuring of society. Those youngsters who represent 
the target region's best and brightest will be sent to schools in the 
"cleansing" nation where they will be transformed into supporters and 
agents of that power. This was one of the steps taken by the Soviet 
Union shortly after it invaded Afghanistan and Chinese authorities 
have practiced this for years in Tibet. Fifth, there must be a strict 
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regime of political repression and authorities will em~l?y imprison-
ment and physical punishment in order to e~force. poh~I~al controls. 
Finally, there will be a population transfer m whIch cItIzens ~f t~e 
"cleansing" power will permanently. relocate in the target nat1o~. 2 
Russians, of course, practiced thIS thro~ghout. t~e n~n-RussI~n 
regions of the USSR and the Chinese are mtenslfymg ~hIS. effort m 
Tibet. City planning maps for Lhasa in the year 2000 m~Ica~e ~hat 
the traditional Tibetan districts will be severely reduced,.bemg hmlt~d 
to little more than the Jokhang and Potala palaces WhICh are desIg-
nated as cultural and tourist sites. 2 • • 
These steps give us a picture of the !ibe~an sItua~IOn. The 
question to be asked is whether or not this sItu~t10n const1tute~ ~hat 
we must regard as a crisis? A crisis is, acc?rdm? t? the tradlt1o~al 
definition, a problem which requires resolut1?n wIth~~ a short penod 
of time. The best illustration of an internatIOnal cnSlS has been the 
Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962. The consequences ?f an 
unacceptable situation drove decision-makers to~ar~ a r~solu~IOn of 
this crisis within a matter of days. The sit~atlon m Tl~et. IS very 
different from that in Cuba in 1962. Most Importantly, It .IS not. a 
military crisis yet is a more or less typical exampl~ of. low mtenslty 
conflict and is a situation which could, under certam cIrcumstances, 
expand in terms of violence if not territory. .. . . 
The Tibetan unrest is a reminder of the contmumg reslhency of 
fonalism in the contemporary world. The activism of the Tibetan ~:s:stance is consistent with the new nationalisms of the. post-
communist world. That nationalism has demonstrated a potential for 
violence, as in Yugoslavia. Moreover, studies .of .the causes ?f was 
typically make note of the fact that . a con.tmumg repres.sIOn of 
legitimate popular aspirations is somethmg wluch promotes vlolence. 
The repression of Tibet must, therefore, be regarded as a threat to 
peace, even if it is localized. In short, ~i?et represents a pro~lem 
which has assumed the dimensions of a cnsls on numerous oc~as~ons. 
The violent outbursts of 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, and ~993. mdicate 
that the Tibetan problem is becoming an acute. SItuatIOn th~t 
routinely threatens to become violent. Under these CIrcumstances, It 
is appropriate to view it as a crisis. 
Is there a need for this problem to be resolved? Can the status 
quo endure indefinitely? As it stands, it represents a challenge to 
Beijing's authority and, under ce~tain ~ircumstances, .could thre~ten 
China's stability. From time to tIme, It becomes an Important . Item _ 
on the agenda of the world community and, as such, forces Chmese 
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authorities into a more isolationist posture. 
The first option to be considered is the complete suppression of 
Tibet's independence movement. The suppression of Tibetan 
nationalism and the full assimilation of Tibet into China is the option 
pursued by Chinese authorities. Certain conditions are necessary to 
support this option. The first is international acceptance of this 
situation. A second condition is political and military resolve by 
Beijing and a willingness to accept the sanctions and protests that 
might follow as a result of the activities of overseas Tibetans. An 
important condition likely to be associated with this option is the 
continuation of discrimination against Tibetans in their own home-
land. As a result of discriminatory policies, Chinese enjoy a signifi-
cant advantage over Tibetans in getting housing, in access to higher 
education, and in hiring for the more desirable jobs. For the most 
part, Tibetans are forced into unskilled jobs and menial labor and are 
limited in their acquisition of technological skills. Even health care 
and provision of food reflect official discrimination in favor of the 
Chinese. For option one to work, Tibetans must be will to accept 
policies which force them into inferior positions relative to the 
Chinese newcomers. 
A second option is autonomy within China. This is the position 
that has long been advocated by the Dalai Lama. Rejecting militants' 
calls for violence against the Chinese, the Dalai Lama has called for 
extensive Tibetan autonomy within China. Under his plan, Tibetans 
would have the right to select their own government but Chinese 
authorities would continue to control foreign relations and national 
defense. Certain conditions are necessary to support this option. 
The first is that Beijing must be willing to grant specific freedoms to 
Tibet. This would include broader rights for Tibetans and an end to 
cultural repressions. It also requires that the Tibetan leadership, 
including the Dalai Lama, must be willing to compromise. By 1994, 
the prospects for this option had, according to the Dalai Lama, 
declined because of pressure from Tibetans who had grown weary of 
efforts to negotiate with Beijing over this matter. These pressures, 
the Dalai Lama insisted, were forcing him to reconsider his policies 
toward the Chinese government and, perhaps, to seek international 
support for an independent Tibet.3 
A third option is complete independence for Tibet. Many in the 
overseas Tibetan community support the option of full Tibetan 
independence and reject the more moderate position generally taken 
by the Dalai Lama. Pursuit of this option raises some important 
108 
Tibet: Endurance of the National Idea 
questions. The first is: could Tibet survive as an independent state? 
The easiest response to this question is the argument that there is 
historical justification for Tibetan independence. It is also important 
to recognize that there are other independent nations comparable to 
Tibet in terms of both economic and political resources. Undoubted-
ly, Tibet's economic self-sufficiency could be difficult to attain but, in 
this respect, it would not be alone. Certain conditions are necessary 
to support this option. The first is international support for indepen-
dence. That support might need to take the form of a willingness on 
the part of other nations to grant concessions to China in return for 
this action. Another necessary condition for achievement of this 
option is a weakened China which could feel compelled to make such 
an important concession in return for needed benefits from wealthy 
Western supported of Tibetan independence. Militant Tibetan 
students, such as those who have often demonstrated in New Delhi, 
with increasing frequency are calling for guerrilla warfare as a way of 
achieving this objective. While the prospects for such an endeavor 
may at first glance appear poor, the experience of the Soviets in 
Afghanistan indicates that a powerful force can be defeated if the 
terrain and the adversary pose the necessary difficulties. The Tibetan 
terrain is certainly a formidable obstacle for any outside military 
hoping to subdue Tibet. A serious Tibetan insurgency might well be 
a decisive factor in promoting Chinese acceptance of this option. 
However, the non-violent orientation of the Tibetans themselves is 
very different from that of the Afghans who faced the Soviet Army 
and works against the prospects of an insurgency. 
Another important question associated with the third option is 
whether or not China could survive. This question is relevant not 
because Tibet by itself is so important to China but because the 
Chinese claim upon Tibet is similar to the claims which also justify 
Chinese control over Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Xinjiang (East 
Turkestan). If you consider, therefore, all four of these regions and 
calculate the consequences of their collective loss from China, there 
emerges a picture of a China which would not be like the present 
nation. Many of the minority areas have rich and important natural 
resources, resources that are especially valuable to a China that has 
embarked on an ambitious course of domestic reforms. Not only do 
the collective minority areas possess significant amounts of oil and 
minerals, they also produce an estimated 80% of China's milk and 
meat and have equal amounts of the nation's livestock. Taking away 
all of these regions would lead to a dramatic reduction in the size of 
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~~~ ~~~~~el~::i~~'b~~::~:' ~i~o~~~i~~ ~:~:~~a~h~~~~tsl;e:en~ size ~akL'~n. a;d Korea. Its border with the former Sovie; unfo~~~~~ 
e ~e uce to a mere fraction of what it is today 4 Th I f 
tern tory prest' d d . . e oss 0 : 1ge, an pro uctIve capacity associated with h 
event mIght well leave China incapable of end . suc an It' f unng as a state 
IS, 0 course, possible that the Tibetan problem 'Il . ~h~:l~~~~:':~~~o;:~::';~l V;:!l :~:~:~~~ :~;;:!~~ ~~~~~~~:~t~~ 
t at endures In the minds of so m . I ea 
existed for forty years without resol~~;nT~~~tapn:;h;;pl~iSits~uI'lal teixoI·nsthfias 
yet another forty ye Th " or difficult confro t t' ars. e world .offers countless instances of such 
. ~ a Ions, many of WhICh have been far more cos I 
thIS one. If an Impasse is what the future holds for Tibet th t Y than 
who are students of international relations will con tin 't ose o~ us 
the struggle of these people who have, against overw~:l~i~xa:: 
bee? able to endure and to preserve their belief in their na . g , 
WhhIle our speculations about this tragic problem will do litttlleOtnhood. 
t e burden of the f' . 0 ease 
certainly enrich our ~~~~~~:~~i~n the clash of i~t~rests,. they will 
the other forces which drive the P~~~~~llture, ethmclty, relIgion, and 
next century. process as we approach the 
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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
lOOTH Congress, 1st Session, H. Con. Res 191 
115 
Whereas His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet is a spiritual leader 
to millions of Buddhists throughout the world, including 
many in the United States: 
Whereas His Holiness the Dalai Lama has persistently promoted 
justice, offered hope to the oppressed, and upheld the rights 
and dignity of all men and women regardless of faith, 
nationality, or political views; 
Whereas his Holiness The Dalai Lama is a world leader who has 
admirably and with dedication advanced the course of 
regional and world peace through adherence to the doctrine 
of nonviolence; 
Whereas His Holiness the Dalai Lama has, through his example, his 
teachings, and his travels, furthered mutual understanding, 
respect, and unity among nations and individuals; and 
Whereas His Holiness the Dalai Lama will be visiting the United 
States in September 1987: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
concurring), That the Congress welcomes His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama of Tibet on the occasion of his visit to the United States, 
commends him for furthering the just and honorable causes that he 
has championed, and offers him the greetings and good wishes of the 
people of the United States. 
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 
S 13530 October 6, 1987 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TIBET BY THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(a) FINDINGS.- The Congress finds that-
(1) on October 1st, 1987, Chinese police in Lhasa fired upon several 
thousand unarmed Tibetan demonstrators, which included hundreds of women, 
children, and Tibetan Buddhist monks, killing at least six and wounding many 
others: 
(2) on September 27, 1987, a peaceful demonstration in Lhasa calling for 
Tibetan independence and the restoration of human rights in Tibet, which was 
led by hundreds of Tibetan monks, was violently broken up by Chinese 
authorities and twenty-seven Tibetan Buddhists monks were arrested; 
(3) in the wake of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's five point peace plan, 
which was presented to the U.S. Congress during his visit to Washington at the 
invitation of Congress on September 24, 1987, Chinese authorities in Tibet 
staged, on September 24, 1987, a mass political rally at which three Tibetans 
were given death sentences, two of whom were executed immediately; 
(4) on September 22, 1987, the Chairnlan and Ranking Minority Member 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairnlan and Ranking Minority 
Member of the House Human Rights Caucus signed a letter to His Excellency 
Zhao Ziayang, the Prime minister of China, expressing their "grave concern with 
the present situation in Tibet and we1come(d) His Holiness the Dalai Lama's 
(five point) proposal as a historic step towards resolving the important questions 
of Tibet and alleviating the suffering of the Tibetan people ... (and) express(ing) 
their full support for his proposal." 
(5) beginning October 7, 1950, the People's Republic of China invaded and 
occupied Tibet, imposed military rule, and continues to exercise dominion over 
the Tibetan people through the presence of a large occupation force; 
(6) over one million Tibetans perished in 1959 to 1979 as a direct result of 
the political instability, executions, imprisonment, and widescale famine 
engendered by the occupation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China; 
(7) after the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, particularly during the 
ravages of China's Cultural Revolution, over 6,000 monasteries, the repositories 
of 1,300 years of Tibet's ancient civilization, have been destroyed and their 
irreplaceable legacy of art and literature either stolen or removed from Tibet; 
(8) Tibet's vast mineral, forest, and animal reserves are being systematically 
exploited by the People's Republic of China, with limited benefit accruing to the 
Tibetan people; 
(9) Tibet's economy and education, health and human services remain far 
below those of the People's Republic of China as a whole; 
(10) the People's Republic of China has undertaken a massive population 
transfer, entailing the immigration of millions of Chinese onto the Tibetan 
plateau in an apparent effort to make the Tibetan people a minority in their own 
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homeland; 
(11) the arrest and execution of Tibetan political and religious prisoners 
continues with thousands of Tibetans currently interred in labor camps; 
(12) Tibet, a nation dedicated to the principles of mutual coexistence 
for a millennia, has been militarized by the Chinese; 
(13) His Holiness the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal leader of the 
Tibetan people, in conjunction with the 100,000 refugees forced into 
exile with him, has worked tirelessly for almost thirty years to secure 
peace and religious freedom in Tibet; 
(14) since 1959, India has generously provided refuge and resources for 
Tibetan exiles so that they may maintain their unique culture and 
religion in the hope of returning to their homeland; 
(15) the People's Republic of China continues to ignore United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions 1353, 1723, and 2079 calling for a cessation of 
human rights violations in Tibet and for implementation of the right of the 
Tibetan people to self-determination; 
(16) 91 Members of the Congress signed a letter to President Li 
Xiannian of the People's Republic of China on July 24,1985, expressing support 
for direct talks between Beijing and representatives of His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-exile, and urging the Government of the 
People's Republic of China "to grant the very reasonable and justified aspirations 
of His holiness the Dalai Lama and his people every consideration," and 
(17) there has been no evidence of any such consideration being granted 
by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICIES-it is the sense of the Congress that-
(1) the United States should make the treatment of the Tibetan people an 
important factor in its conduct ofrelations with the People's Republic of China; 
(2) the President should meet with his Holiness the Dalai Lama to 
express United States support for his efforts for world peace and particularly his 
efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Tibetan problem; 
(3) the United States should urge the Government of the People's 
Republic of China to actively reciprocate the Dalai Lama's efforts to establish 
a constructive dialogue over the future status of Tibet; 
(4) the United States, through the Secretary of State-
(a) should address and call attention to the rights of the Tibetan people, 
as well as other non-Chinese within the People's Republic of China as the 
Uighurs of Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang), the Mongolians ofInner Mongolia, and 
the Manchus of Manchuria, and 
(b) should support efforts to maintain Tibet's identity and preserve 
Tibetan culture and religion, both inside Tibet and among those in exile; 
(5) congressional delegations should visit Tibet (including the areas of 
Kham and Amdo) and the Tibetans in exile in order to witness the progress 
being made and the problems faced; and 
(6) the President should instruct the United States Ambassadors to the 
People's Republic of China and India to work closely with the Tibetan people to 
find areas in which the United States Government and people can be helpful. 
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(c) Any notification submitted to the Congress pursuant to the Anus 
Export Control Act with respect to any sale, licensed export, or other transfer of 
any defense articles or defense services to the People's Republic of China shall 
be accompanied by a Presidential detennination that the Government of the 
People's Republic of China is acting in good faith and in a timely manner to 
resolve human rights issues in Tibet. 
(d) Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Congress of the human rights 
situation in Tibet and the transfer of millions of Chinese to Tibet. 
(e) Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Department 
of State for "Migration and Refugee assistance" for each of the fiscal years 1988 
and 1989, not less than $200,000 shall be available only for assistance for Tibetan 
refugees. 
(f) For each of the fiscal years 1988 and 1989, the Director of the 
United States Infonnation Agency shall make available to Tibetan students and 
professionals who are outside Tibet not less than 15 scholarships for study at 
institutions of higher education in the United States. 
Mr. Pell. Mr. President, this amendment, proposed by the Senator from 
North Carolina my friend, Mr. Helms, and I, directs the attention of all people 
to the cruel treatment, the rape of Tibet that has been going on in the last few 
days and has been going on for the last few decades. 
Tibet, a country with a proud history and independent tradition, in the 
past was occupied, as we all know, by the Chinese in the late 1950's and since 
then has been a very harsh regime. I recognize that the chinese have taken steps 
in the last few years to unscramble the omelet, to undo some of the damage that 
was done about 10 or 15 years ago by their people. 
But, nevertheless, the tragedy of Tibet continues. The maltreatment of 
Tibet citizens continues. All told, I think the Senate should take a note of that 
fact, and that is exactly what the Senator from North Carolina and I seek to do. 
Two weeks ago the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the 
House Foreign Affair Committee, hosted His Holiness the Dalai Lama here in 
the United States Capitol. The Dalai Lama raised at that time a five-point peace 
plan for the resolution of problems confronting the people of Tibet under the 
rule of Beijing. The plan, simply stated, called for improvement, in the human 
rights and democratic freedoms of the people of Tibet. It was a peaceful plan, 
and called for the transfonnation of the whole of Tibet into a work zone of 
peace. 
Immediately in the wake of peace initiative, Chinese authorities saw fit 
to crack down on Buddhist monks and native Tibetans in Lhasa in the most 
severe manner. They publicly executed three monks, jailed numerous others, and 
when the Tibetan people reacted in peaceful protest, continued their crackdown, 
resulting finally in the traffic events of this week. 
In protest ofthe Chinese action Tibetan monks and people demonstrat-
ed in front of a Chinese police station where some 30 monk were held in 
detention. During the ensuring struggle, Chinese police fired on the demonstra-
tors, killing and maiming several men, women, and children. Today it is reported 
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that Chinese troops are being airlifted to the area, giving every indication that 
the crackdown will continue. 
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AMENDMENT 
HOUSE RESOLUTION 1777 
TITLE VII - HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TIBET 
BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Sec. 701 Findings 
The Congress finds that-
. . (1) th~ People's Republic of China imposed its rule over Tibet through 
mIlItary force m 1949, and continues to exercise dominion over the Tibetan 
people through the presence of a large occupation force; 
(2) over one million Tibetans have perished since 1949 as a direct result 
of political instability, imprisonment, and widescale famine; 
(3) after 1949, particularly during the ravages of China's cultural 
rev~lutio?,. ?ve: 6,000 monasteries, the repositories of 1,300 years of Tibet's 
ancIe~t cIvIlIzatJ~:m, were destroyed and their irreplaceable national legacy of art 
and lIterature eIther stolen or removed from Tibet; 
(4) the Tibetan's standard ofliving, health, and human services remain 
far below those of the People's Republic of China as a whole; 
(5) Tibetans and others are concerned about the political, cultural, and 
economic implications of the policy of the People's Republic of China of 
encouraging large numbers of Chinese to move to Tibet; 
. (6! th~re are credible reports, confinned by Amnesty International, of 
tIbetans bemg mcarcerated and killed for the nonviolent expression of their 
religious and political beliefs; 
(7) His Holiness the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal leader of the 
T!betan people, in. conjunction with the 100,000 refugees forced into exile with 
hrrn, has ~or~ed tIrelessly for almost thirty years to secure peace and religious 
freedom m TIbet, as well as the preservation of the Tibetan culture' 
(8) in 1959, 1961, and 1965 the United Nations General Asse:nbly called 
upon the People's Republic of China to end the violations of the Tibetan's 
human rights; 
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(9) 91 Members of the Congress signed a letter to President Li 
Xiannian of the People's Republic of China on July 24,1985, expressing support 
for direct talks between Beijing and representatives of His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama and the Tibetans in exile, and urging the Government of the People's 
Republic of China "to grant the very reasonable and justified aspirations of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people every consideration," and 
(10) there has been no evidence of any such consideration being granted 
by the Government of the People's Republic of China. 
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